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On 27 January 2017, President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America issued an 
Executive Order entitled, ‘Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United 
States’.1 On 6 March 2017, a second Executive Order of the same name was issued as a 
replacement to the first.2 Both orders, to different degrees, have the effect of restricting the 
entry of nationals of certain primarily Muslim countries and suspending the United States 
Refugee Admissions Program for a period of 120 days. Protests erupted across the U.S. in 
response to what is commonly referred to as the ‘travel ban’ or ‘Muslim ban’.3 Subsequently, 
on 24 September 2017, the President issued Proclamation 9645, entitled ‘Enhanced Vetting 
Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists 
or Other Public-Safety Threats.’4 Courts in the U.S. have considered the legality of the EOs 
following petitions seeking temporary restraining orders; however such cases have solely 
focused on the legality of the executive orders under domestic U.S. law.  
Under international law, the U.S. has signed and ratified the Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees,5 which itself encompasses the definition of a refugee and a litany of refugee 
rights as derived from the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.6 Thus, the U.S. 
is subject to specific obligations towards refugees under international law. This paper will 
examine when, under the UN Convention and Protocol, a national state may refuse to grant 
asylum to a refugee under the auspices of ‘national security’. This includes instances where 
refugees are stopped at the border of a state; where recognised refugee status is revoked on the 
grounds of ‘national security’; and finally, where legislation and policies are implemented to 
prevent refugees from even attempting to apply for asylum. Overall, this paper seeks to answer 
the question whether the ‘travel ban’ executive orders and the Proclamation were in violation 
                                                      
1 Executive Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017). Hereafter ‘EO1’. 
2 Executive Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017). Hereafter ‘EO2’. 
3 Andrew Buncombe ‘Donald Trump's Muslim ban inspires mass protests across the United States involving 
millions of Americans: Thousands of protesters in different cities have launched loud, vociferous protests’ 
Independent 30 January 2017, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-
muslim-ban-protests-us-refugee-immigration-policy-syria-iran-iraq-demonstrations-a7553476.html, accessed 
on 9 July 2017. 
4 Proclamation 9645 Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting 
Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (2017). Hereafter ‘the 
Proclamation’. 
5 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967. Hereafter ‘the Protocol’. Pursuant to Article I (1) of the 
Protocol, “[t]he States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the 
Convention to refugees hereinafter defined.” Ibid. 
6 UNHCR Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951. Hereafter ‘UN Convention’. 
 7 
of the United States’ obligations under international law, and specifically under the UN 
Convention and Protocol.  
Refugees are some of the most vulnerable people in society. According to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are reportedly 22.5 million 
refugees worldwide, with 55% fleeing from South Sudan, Afghanistan and Syria.7 Having fled 
their homes out of fear of persecution or war, many arrive at the borders of foreign countries 
seeking safety for themselves and their families. It is thus necessary for states to understand 
and comply with their obligations under international law regarding refugees and particularly, 
to not unnecessarily enact policies in direct conflict with such obligations. It is important that 
states do not abuse the exceptions made available to them under international law in order to 
employ policies that would cause both harm and suffering, and a violation of international 
human rights.  
After the attacks on September 11, 2001, international terrorism was publically linked 
to refugees by the United Nations Security Council8 – even though no refugees were involved 
in any of those attacks.9 Thus, in considering refugee and immigration legislation, states have 
increasingly linked national security issues to that immigration and refugee law. Prior to the 
9/11attacks, academic writing generally focused on the extent of states’ obligations to refugees 
under international law and the recognition of refugee rights. Post-9/11, there was an increase 
in academic writing examining the connection between national security, immigration and 
refugees. However, despite the existence of restrictions on the admission of refugees in the 
west, there appeared to be a more liberal progression in immigration and refugee policies 
towards a more humanitarian and open approach.  
In September 2015, the European Union and United Kingdom appeared ready and 
willing to accept Syrian refugees across their borders. David Cameron, as Prime Minister, 
stated that the U.K. had a ‘moral responsibility’ towards refugees and that the U.K. sought to 
accept 20’000 refugees by 2020.10 Following this, the German Vice-Chancellor, Sigmar 
Gabriel, stated that Germany could receive 500’000 asylum seekers each year in the following 
years.11 However, after the Paris attacks on 13 November 2015, migration and refugee law 
                                                      
7 UNHCR ‘Figures at a Glance’ 19 June 2017, available at http://www.unhcr.org/afr/figures-at-a-glance.html, 
accessed on 9 July 2017. 
8 UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001) 3(f)-(g). 
9 Geoff Gilbert ‘Terrorism and international refugee law’ in Ben Saul (ed) Research Handbook on International 
Law and Terrorism (2014) 470. 
10 ‘UK to Accept 20,000 Refugees from Syria by 2020’ BBC 7 September 2015, available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34171148, accessed on 9 July 2017. 
11 ‘Migrant crisis: Germany ‘can take 500,000 asylum seekers a year’ BBC 8 September 2015, available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34185353, accessed on 9 July 2017. 
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once again came to the forefront of national security.12 In the U.S., Donald Trump had begun 
his campaign for President, holding forth on aims of implementing radical policies regarding 
immigration and refugee law. His campaign and subsequent election, as well the campaigns of 
right-wing parties in Europe, sparked new academic literature examining the relationship 
between national security, immigration and refugees. The legal fight regarding Trump’s EOs 
is currently ongoing. Thus, this paper aims to be at the forefront of legal analysis of the United 
States’ policies regarding refugees and immigration. 
 
II. Literature Review 
This paper will broadly consider four main topics to assess when states may reject refugees 
based on national security, and specifically, to examine President Trump’s executive orders 
and the Proclamation under international law. In this chapter, first, this literature review will 
consider the principle of non-refoulement and how it has been interpreted and applied in a U.S. 
context. Secondly, it will consider the general overlap between immigration law and national 
security. Thirdly, it will look more specifically into writings on the relationship between U.S. 
immigration law, national security and counter-terrorism. Fourthly, this literature review will 
examine the extent to which national security has influenced U.S. refugee law and subsequently 
how refugee law relates to national security in a more general sense. Fifthly, this review will 
examine literature on U.S. immigration law written in light of the EOs and finally will consider 
some of the most prominent U.S. court cases that have resulted from the EOs.  
This review will largely cover sources in a chronological order; however, some sources 
have been discussed earlier because of their relevance to a particular topic. It is important to 
note that literature written before the 9/11 attacks will not have taken into account the emotional 
and fearful outlook that arose post-9/11 – as well as the legislative responses. Literature written 
before President Trump’s campaign would have been less likely to anticipate the renewed rise 
of extreme conservatism in the west and the drastic legislative changes that he has promulgated. 
Notably, while some earlier sources may have theorised on Trump’s campaign claim that he 
would enact a ‘Muslim ban’, only literature written after he officially signed in the EOs will 
be able to provide any in depth analysis into the legality of the controversial EOs. 
 
                                                      
12 Anton Troianovski ‘Paris Attacks May Unsettle EU’s Debate on Migration’ Wall Street Journal 14 November 
2015, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/paris-attacks-may-unsettle-eus-debate-on-migration-
1447510975, accessed on 9 July 2017. 
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(a) The Principle of Non-Refoulement in a U.S. Context 
The principle of non-refoulement is considered to be the cornerstone of refugee law by the 
UNHCR13 as well as by academics.14 It is found in Article 33(1) of the 1951 UN Convention 
and 1967 Protocol, which states: 
No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to 
the frontiers of territories where his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened on account of 
his [or her] race, religion, nationality, membership or a particular social group or political 
opinion. 
 
Article 33(2)15 provides for the only exception to this principle, which states that: 
The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there 
are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, 
or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes 
a danger to the community of that country [own emphasis].’  
 
According to Fatima Khan and James Hathaway, the French term refouler was used in order 
to allow for an expansion of the interpretation of this section. The English words ‘expel’ and 
‘return’ were argued to be too restrictive, as ‘expel’ implies that a refugee has already been 
admitted into the country, and ‘return’ may not always be applied to a refugee who has yet to 
enter a country’s territory.16 Thus, according to Khan and Hathaway17 persons who have not 
yet entered the territory of a country may still benefit from the protection of the non-
refoulement principle. Additionally, the principle of non-refoulement has been held by the 
UNHCR to apply to any person who meets the requirements of the refugee definition in the 
UN Convention – they do not need to be formally recognised as a refugee by any member 
state.18 
The United States Supreme Court case of Sale19 examined the United States’ 
obligations regarding the principle of non-refoulement. The case concerned an executive 
order20 of President George H. W. Bush which continued a previous executive order mandating 
the Coast Guard to interdict and repatriate Haitians fleeing to the U.S. on the high seas. 
However, this order removed the previous order’s requirement that the Coast Guard perform a 
refugee screening process. The executive order was challenged under the claim that it violated 
                                                      
13 UNHCR ‘Note on the principle of non-refoulement’ (1997), available at http://www.refworld.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=438c6d972&skip=0&query=note%20on%20the%20principle%20of
%20non-refoulement, accessed on 10 July 2017. 
14 James Hathaway The Rights of Refugees under International Law (2005) 279. 
15 Article 33(2) of the UN Convention. 
16 Fatima Khan and Tal Schreier (eds) Refugee Law in South Africa (2014) 4-5. 
17 Hathaway op cit note 14 at 316. 
18 UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (1979) para 28. 
19 Sale v Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993). 
20 Executive Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1993). 
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§243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)21 in addition to Article 33 of the UN 
Protocol. The court held that the executive order was not in violation of either §243(h) of the 
INA nor Article 33 of the UN Protocol.  
It is arguable that this decision was decided on an incorrect interpretation of 
international law and jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the appellate 
court, held that neither section 243(h) nor Article 33 applied to the actions of the Coast Guard 
on the high seas, as the Haitians were not in ‘United States territory’ and thus were not 
protected by either provision.22 However, the court failed to consider the Lotus case23 which 
held that an occurrence on board a vessel on the high seas must be regarded as if it occurred on 
the territory of the state whose flag the ship was flying. Thus, when the U.S. Coast Guard 
intercepted Haitians fleeing Haiti, by bringing the Haitians aboard their vessels in order to 
return them, such persons were within U.S. territory. Therefore, the U.S. was arguably in 
violation of both section 243(h) of the INA and Article 33 of the Protocol by failing to recognise 
that the Haitians returned were, under international law, on U.S. territory.  
Hathaway and Cusack further analysed the United States’ uneasy relationship with 
international law, and particularly with regard to refugee and human rights law.24 Specifically, 
the article examines the cases of Stevin25 and Cadenza-Fonseca26 in which the United States 
Supreme Court found that the only clear obligation on the U.S. under the UN Convention was 
that of non-refoulement. Additionally, this duty was only owed to refugees who were able to 
show a probability of persecution – a much higher threshold than the ‘reasonable possibility’ 
of persecution found in the UN Convention. [own emphasis]27  
Hathaway and Cusick critique the U.S. courts’ failure to interpret international refugee 
law with consideration to foreign and international law.28 This article highlights the early 
disconnect between the United States’ interpretation of refugee law in comparison to the 
international regime – a standard of conduct that was followed in subsequent U.S. cases.29 It 
thus provides a useful lens with which to view current U.S. cases regarding international 
                                                      
21 Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952. 
‘The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation or return of any alien to any country in which in his 
opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion and for such 
period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.’  
22 Sale supra note 19 at 2550. 
23 The Lotus Case (France v Turkey) 1927 PCIJ Reports Series A, No.10. 
24 James C Hathaway and Anne K Cusick ‘Refugee Rights Are Not Negotiable’ (2000) 14(2) Georgetown 
Immigration Law Journal 481. 
25 INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). 
26 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
27 Hathaway and Cusick op cit note 24 at 485-6. 
28 Ibid at 484. 
29 Ibid at 515. 
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refugee law. However, this article is limited, as it does not examine the national security 
exemptions to Article 1F30 or Article 33(2) of the UN Convention in any depth – and certainly 
not in light of the much more security-conscious west that existed after the 9/11 attacks.  
(b) Overlap between Immigration Law and National Security 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 provoked academic research into the causes and 
consequences of terrorism and how such acts relate to the international legal order. Specifically 
relevant to this paper is how the fight against terrorism and concern for national security were 
subsequently intimately linked to immigration and refugee law. Peter van Krieken provides a 
detailed overview of the policies of the UN, International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
and the European-Union.31 He also considers the limitations on rejecting refugees on national 
security grounds under the UN Convention.  
This work is useful in that it provides for and assesses the immigration and counter-
terror policy recommendations and reactions made by the IOM and UNHCR in the wake of the 
9/11 attacks – such as for improved information and identification systems.32 It shows how 
immigration controls and enforcement were strengthened, and considers the effect on 
international refugee protection.33 However, it is largely important in highlighting that, even in 
the immediate months following the 9/11 attacks, it was recognised that “immigration controls 
can only be a ‘needle in the haystack’ measure to counter terrorism. While tightening the 
asylum process has, in countries like the U.S., led to a reduction in the number of unfounded 
claims, there may be no linkage here with the deterrence of terrorism.”34 
(c) Relationship between U.S. Immigration Law, National Security & Terrorism 
Donald Kerwin specifically examines the effect of the 9/11 attacks on U.S. policy, considering 
the efficacy of such developments and their impact on refugee rights.35 In particular, he 
examines how stricter immigration and refugee law and enforcement may violate refugee rights 
under domestic U.S. legislation, such as the right to due process and issues with blanket 
detention.36 However, it fails to assess specific violations of refugee rights under international 
law; thus it is useful purely for an examination of the policy developments in domestic U.S. 
legislation following the 9/11 attacks.  
                                                      
30 Article 1F of the UN Convention; full text found on page 32. 
31 P.J. van Krieken Terrorism and the International Legal Order (2002) 435-58. 
32 Ibid at 442. 
33 Ibid at 447-54. 
34 Ibid at 447. 
35 Donald Kerwin ‘The Use and Misuse of “National Security” Rationale in Crafting U.S. Refuge and 
Immigration Policies’ (2005) 17 International Journal of Refugee Law 749. 
36 Ibid at 756-7. 
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A more recent article, by Arthur Rizer, also looks into the effects of fear on national 
security and immigration law.37 This article is also primarily focused on U.S. immigration law 
and policy; however it is able to take into account newer developments, including the Trump 
presidential campaign. It shows how the fear, that resulted immigration law developing into a 
focus in counter-terrorism, has continued to prevail in recent years – and is still driving changes 
and restrictions in immigration and refugee policy.38 However, while this article is able to 
account for more recent developments in U.S. law and policy, it does not consider refugee 
rights or potential violations of international law.  
Similarly, David Cole deals with the constitutional issues in U.S. federal law regarding 
policies which punish those guilty by association, including exclusion clauses to refugee 
status.39 Specifically, he examines how such policies violate the First and Fifth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution;40 however, like Kerwin and Rizer he does not explicitly 
analyse whether such policies are consistent with international law or to what extent they may 
be in violation of the UN Protocol. This article is exclusively relevant to the overlap between 
national security and immigration in a U.S. context.  
An author who does consider the effects of the stepping up of national security on U.S. 
immigration policy in light of international refugee law is Jordan Fischer.41 Specifically, he 
examines how the U.S policy of barring asylum seekers from refugee status where they have 
provided ‘material support’ to terrorist organisations/terrorist activities goes beyond the scope 
of the exclusion clause in Article 33(2) of the UN Convention.42 In particular, he considers and 
interprets the meaning of the words contained in Article 33(2), such as the requirement of 
‘reasonable grounds’. Further, he highlights the flaws in the Patriot Act43 and REAL ID Act44 
in how they fail to require intentional mens rea in assigning guilt. Thus, refugees who provided 
aid unknowingly to a terrorist organisation, with the intent of spreading peace or promoting 
education, would be barred. Additionally, it does not account for the defence of duress.45 This 
                                                      
37 Arthur L. Rizer III ‘The Ever-Changing Bogeyman: How Fear Has Driven Immigration Law and Policy’ 
(2016) 77 Louisiana Law Review 243. 
38 Ibid at 245-6. 
39 David Cole ‘Terror Financing, Guilt by Association and the Paradigm of Prevention in the “War on Terror”’ 
in Andrea Bianchi and Alexis Keller (eds) Counterterrorism: Democracy’s Challenge (2008). 
40 Ibid at 241-6. 
41 Jordan Fischer ‘The United States and the Material-Support Bar for Refugees: A Tenuous Balance Between 
National Security and Basic Human Rights’ (2012) 5 Drexel Law Review 237. 
42 Ibid at 258-9. 
43 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001. 
44 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 
2005. 
45 Fischer op cite note 41 at 256-7. 
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article thus provides a recent and in-depth analysis of U.S. policy regarding its international 
obligations; however, it has a primary focus on the ‘material-support bar’ and does not consider 
a refugee or travel ban such as the one(s) enacted by President Trump. Nevertheless, it is 
important to understand how U.S. refugee and immigration policy has been interpreted in the 
context of its international law obligations. 
Reconsidering the issue of non-refoulement, Jacob Oakes provides a recent analysis of 
U.S. immigration policy in terms of international refugee law.46 He considers the practice of 
U.S. immigration law in light of Article 33 of the UN Convention − but also regarding the 
inclusion of the principle of non-refoulement within the UN Convention against Torture47 and 
the Organization of American States (OAS).48 He also examines the discrepancies between the 
provisions found in the INA with regard to determining refugee status in comparison to 
international law.49 This source is particularly important as it provides a detailed analysis of 
U.S. law’s congruency – or lack thereof – with the international refugee law regime. However, 
it does not delve specifically into the national security exceptions and, while it does briefly 
mention some of Trump’s presidential campaign statements, it does not comment on the 
ramifications of a refugee or travel ban under international law.50  
(d) Influence of National Security on U.S. Refugee law, and its Relationship with the 
International Refugee Regime 
With regard to the interaction between refugee law and national security in a more general 
sense, Geoff Gilbert considers first, how the threat of terrorism may form part of the 
persecution requirement in obtaining refugee status, and secondly, how states may legally 
exclude refugees from refugee status on the basis of terrorism.51 Specifically, he argues that 
while states may have a right and an obligation to combat terrorism, “[s]tates are not allowed 
to combat international terrorism at all costs. They must not resort to methods which undermine 
the very values they seek to protect.”52  
Gilbert, unlike the previous authors discussed, does analyse Article 1F of the UN 
Convention in depth, and examines how terrorism would fit within this provision. This is 
                                                      
46 Jacob Oakes ‘U.S. Immigration Policy: Enforcement & Deportation Trump Fair Hearings – Systematic 
Violations of International Non-Refoulement Obligations Regarding Refugees’ (2016) 41 North Carolina 
Journal of International Law 833. 
47 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT), 1984. 
48 Charter of the Organization of American States, 1967. 
49 Oakes op cit note 46 at 846-9. 
50 Ibid at 838 n19, 886. 
51 Gilbert op cit note 9 at 470. 
52 Saadi v Italy, App No 37201/06, (2009) 49 EHRR 30. 
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particularly relevant to President Trump’s EOs, as these orders suspended the refugee 
programme with the intention of protecting the national security of the U.S. – specifically from 
terrorist threats.53 Like Fischer, he considers the practice of ‘guilt-by-association’ and the 
potential defence of duress; however, Gilbert examines such practices under Article 1F, and 
also from a global perspective – not purely an American one. Gilbert also considers Article 33 
of the UN Convention, and its relationship to national security and terrorism; however he does 
not go into much detail other than to consider on what occasions one would apply Article 33 
rather than Article 1F.  
Elspeth Guild, also in the Handbook on International Law and Terrorism, considers the 
relationship between terrorism and migration law.54 It is necessary to consider both the chapter 
on refugee law and on migration law, as refugees fall within the greater category of migrants. 
Additionally, in many cases a refugee may be misclassified as a migrant, and thus it is also 
important to consider the protections available to migrants under international law such as the 
CAT and the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.55 Pertinent to the consideration of 
President Trump’s EOs is Guild’s argument against racial and religious profiling in order to 
determine if persons are more likely to be involved in terrorist activities, specifically where 
citizenship of a certain country is used as a proxy in order to religiously or racially profile.56 
However, while migration law as a whole does encompass much of refugee law, this paper 
aims to focus more specifically on the effects of the national security exceptions and the EOs 
on refugees – and thus Guild’s chapter is relevant to a limited extent. 
In a very recent article, Elizabeth Leiserson examines how many states have created 
policies that ‘avoid’ issues of non-refoulement by not technically returning refugees, but 
making it almost impossible for them to apply or access asylum processes [own emphasis].57 
Such policies are referred to as non-entrée policies, a term coined by Hathaway. Leiserson 
considers and explains how non-entrée policies can violate the principle of non-refoulement 
and thus states’ obligations under international refugee law.58 In particular, she examines 
whether states are able to defend their non-entrée policies under the national security exception 
in Article 33(2) of the UN Convention. Through a case study on the policies and treaties of the 
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European Union, she argues that “[c]ountries that have signed the Refugee Convention should 
not be permitted to invoke broad national security arguments to avoid their responsibilities to 
admit and care for refugees.”59 Overall, Lieserson’s article is relevant in that it takes a closer 
look at whether the subtler exclusionary policies of many western states violate international 
refugee law – and particularly, her case study on the European Union will hold many parallels 
to this paper’s consideration of the U.S. ‘travel ban’.  
(e) U.S. Immigration Law and the ‘Travel-Ban’ Executive Orders  
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia considers the U.S. immigration policies proposed under the Trump 
presidency, and the legality of his then-proposed ‘Muslim ban’.60 However, her article does 
not consider the executive orders themselves. Nevertheless, she conducts an analysis as to the 
feasibility, legality and moral considerations of a ‘Muslim/travel ban’. This analysis takes into 
account the United States’ obligations under domestic law and the U.S. Constitution, but does 
not consider international law other than in a few brief references.61 Notably, she discusses 
new changes in immigration legislation, noting that Congress has failed to take action on an 
immigration reform bill in the last two decades.62 
Although immigration and refugee law in the U.S. is a federal issue, as will be discussed 
in the next section of this paper, Wadhia notes that 31 U.S. states have declared that they will 
reject Syrian refugees. Thus, she subsequently examines the legality of individual state action 
with regard to refugee law and policy. Finally, she draws on parallels between the proposals 
and responding legislation that was enacted in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and those put 
forward by President Trump.63 Therefore, this article is useful in that it considers the effect and 
legality of Trump’s proposed Muslim ban, specifically regarding refugees. However, the 
exclusive analysis of U.S. law limits its relevance to this paper. 
The most recent article to be discussed in this literature review is by Jennifer M. 
Chacón.64 She considers the history of immigration law in the U.S. up to and including the 
travel ban executive orders, in addition to other executive orders and memoranda from the 
Department of Homeland Security.65 She examines the restrictive immigration policies already 
present under the Obama presidency, and how Trump’s Administration has only gone further 
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– and specifically, on the basis of weak and distorted evidence.66 Critically, she analyses 
President Trump’s authority to enact the ban and its legality under the INA, taking into account 
the judgment in the case of Washington v Trump.67 However, as with much of the literature 
reviewed, Chacón does not examine the development of immigration law nor the EOs under 
international law.  
(f) U.S. Case Law on the ‘Travel-Ban’ Executive Orders 
The first ‘travel ban’ executive order provoked multiple lawsuits in courts across the United 
States.68 Most pertinent are those of Washington v Trump, Hawaii v Trump69 and its subsequent 
appeal.70 These cases examine the legality of the travel ban EOs – but only to the limited extent 
necessary in order to grant a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. This 
requires only that the plaintiffs establish that they have a strong likelihood of success on the 
merits of their claim.71 All the cases found the plaintiffs to have standing, that the President’s 
executive orders were reviewable by the judiciary and that the claims were ripe.72 Both 
Washington v Trump and Hawaii v Trump granted the temporary restraining orders requested 
and subsequent preliminary injunctions; and the court on appeal court upheld the injunction 
order, but to a lesser extent.  
The case of Washington v Trump – regarding the first EO – specifically focused on 
legal issues regarding due process and religious discrimination with consideration for the 
balance between the hardships suffered by the plaintiffs, and the public interest.73 In contrast, 
in the case of Hawaii v Trump (March), the court considered the second EO – as the second 
order revoked the first. Regarding the merits of the claim, the court examined whether the EO2 
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment – due to the EO2’s potential implied 
discriminatory purpose.74 Thus, the court scrutinised EO2’s primary purpose in light of its 
historical background, EO1 and President Trump’s campaign statements and tweets.75 Notably, 
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the court found that “the EO’s focus on nationality, could have the paradoxical effect of 
‘bar[ring] entry to a Syrian national who had lived in Switzerland for decades, but not a Swiss 
national who had immigrated to Syria during its civil war’, revealing a ‘gross mismatch 
between the [Executive] Order’s ostensible purpose and its implementation and effects.’”76 
The most recent case, at the time of this literature review, is that of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Hawaii v Trump.77 The appellate court held both that the 
President exceeded the scope of his authority by not meeting the precondition of a “sufficient 
finding that the entry of these classes of people would be ‘detrimental to the interests of the 
United States” – resulting in EO2 being inconsistent with the INA’s prohibition on nationality-
based discrimination; and that he failed to follow the correct INA procedure in modifying the 
annual cap on refugees.78 The court specifically addressed the suspension of the U.S. refugee 
resettlement program under §1182(f) of the INA, finding the justifications given in EO2 to be 
insufficient to support an assertion that the travel and admission of refugees would be 
detrimental to the interests of the U.S.79 Additionally, the court found that the provisions of the 
INA allowed the President of the U.S. to increase the number of refugees after the start of the 
year, once he had consulted with Congress; however there was no mechanism in place for him 
to decrease the number of refugees [own emphasis].80  
Nevertheless, though the court provides an in-depth legal analysis of the executive-
orders in light of the current U.S. political and legal climate, the court is not bound to consider 
international law when deciding its cases.81 Thus, though it is important for this paper to 
consider the legality of the EOs under U.S. law, its relevance will be limited when examining 
the legality of the EOs under international law. Additionally, much of the case law on the EOs 
focuses on the effects of the travel ban regarding migrants generally and not refugees.  
In brief, the mass of literature so far largely covers non-refoulement of refugees under 
international law, the national security exceptions under international law and the relationship 
between U.S. immigration law and national security. However, there are very few papers which 
individually cover all of these topics together. This paper aims to do just that. It aims to provide 
an outline of the international refugee law regime, and subsequently an examination of U.S. 
immigration and refugee law and policy. It aims to analyse the ‘travel ban’ executive orders to 
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see whether they are in violation of the United States’ obligations under international law – 
something which has not been discussed in the preceding literature. Overall, this paper will 
show that, “[n]ational security is not a “talismanic incantation’ that, once invoked, can support 
any and all exercise of executive power under §1182(f).”82 
 
III. Methodology 
The methodology of this paper is that of a desktop-based study. The main sources referred to 
are international law, United Nations sources, U.S. domestic law, case law, academic journals, 
books and online sources. This paper will specifically focus on the U.S. as, as a major power 
in the world today, its policies and practices have global effect. The consequences of the 
‘travel-ban’ and EOs will be felt by thousands; and may later affect the policies of other nations 
regarding their immigration and refugee laws.  
It is also necessary to examine whether immigration and refugee law is a state or federal 
issue within the U.S., specifically regarding the application of EO2 and the ability of a court 
of a state of the U.S. to impose a nationwide injunction. Following the case of Hawaii v Trump 
(June),83 confirming what was stated by the court in Washington v Trump,84 it was held that 
immigration laws should be enforced vigorously and uniformly,85 meaning that decisions 
regarding immigration law should be applied nationwide whenever possible. The courts in both 
cases further stated that an immigration policy that was ‘fragmented’ and differed from state 
to state would be in violation of the constitutional and statutory requirement that immigration 
law and policy be uniform.86 Therefore, this paper will be assessing when a state can reject 
refugees or revoke refugee status, and specifically the U.S. ‘travel-ban’ EOs, at a federal level 
rather than at an individual state level. 
 
IV. Structure 
As a whole, this paper will cover first, international refugee law; secondly, the national security 
exceptions to refugee status and the admission of refugees; thirdly, current U.S. immigration 
and refugee law and finally, the ‘travel-ban’ executive orders in light of the United States’ 
international obligations. Chapter one introduced the paper, provided a review of the literature 
to date and the methodology of this paper. Following, in chapter two, this paper will provide 
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an overview of the international refugee law regime, examining the definition of a refugee 
under the relevant international treaties and academic opinions. It will consider the extent to 
which nation states are bound by their obligations under certain treaties and whether some 
obligations have reached the status of customary international law.  
Chapter three will outline the national security exceptions to refugee status under 
international law – in particular with regard to Article 33(2) and Article 1F of the UN 
Convention.87 Article 33(2) provides for national security exceptions to the principle of non-
refoulement, whereas Article 1F provides for general exceptions to the recognition of refugee 
status. This chapter will also consider the concept of non-entrée and how this relates to the 
principle of non-refoulement in Article 33. Chapter four will outline the United States’ 
domestic immigration and refugee law regime – and in particular under the INA and Refugees 
Act of 1980.88 It will also examine relevant case law, and the extent to which the U.S. courts 
have considered international law when making their judgments – specifically with the 
intention of assessing the relationship between U.S. domestic law and international law. 
Chapter five will perform an analysis of President Trump’s ‘travel-ban’ EOs. It will 
consider the content of the orders, their objectives and implementation. It will look at the U.S. 
court cases in response to the EOs and uncover parallels between how the orders violate 
domestic law and potentially violate international law. Finally, this paper will assess whether 
the EOs violate the United States’ international law obligations – holding that a blanket ban on 
refugees and the bulk of persons from certain states does not fall within the scope of the national 
security exceptions provided in international law. In conclusion, this paper will hold, in chapter 
six, that the ‘travel-ban’ executive orders violate the United States’ obligations under 
international law.  
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Chapter Two  
I. Definition of a Refugee 
There is no single universal definition of a refugee. Refugees have existed long before they 
were specifically named and made subject to legislation. Broadly they could be described as ‘a 
person fleeing life-threatening conditions’;89 however, in the legal and political sphere, the 
definition of a refugee is more limited. It is also important to note the difference between a 
refugee and someone called a ‘migrant’. A migrant is a person who travels from one state to 
another for a wide variety of reasons or purposes; a refugee is a person who migrates out of 
necessity. What is required to necessitate one to migrate, however, is the subject of much 
legislation and debate.  
(a) International Law 
International refugee law can arguably be said to have begun in 1921, with the ‘Nansen 
passport’, which was a travel document intended to assist in the migration of Russian 
refugees.90 In 1948, the Universal Declaration for Human Rights91 was adopted by the United 
Nations, following World War II. The 1951 UN Convention soon followed – and was 
developed from Article 14 of the UDHR. Article 14(1) provides that: ‘Everyone has the right 
to seek and to enjoy in other counties asylum from persecution [own emphasis].’92 This 
provision provides for the right to seek asylum and to enjoy asylum; however it does not 
provide for the right to be granted asylum [own emphasis]. Thus, there is no obligation on a 
state to grant a person asylum. As a result, there is a tension between a state’s right to 
sovereignty and the rights of a refugee.93 Article 1(2) of the UN Convention states: 
 A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee” shall apply to any 
person who: 
(2)  As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.94 
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In 1967, the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees95 entered into force. This 
protocol removed both the geographic and temporal restrictions that required a refugee to be 
fleeing events that occurred ‘in Europe’ and ‘before 1 January 1951’. However, not all states 
that signed and ratified the UN Convention subsequently signed and ratified the 1967 Protocol. 
Thus, these states are not required to recognise people as refugees if they are fleeing from 
events that occurred after this date. The United States has signed and ratified the protocol, 
which encompasses the 1951 UN Convention.  
The definition in the UN Convention requires that a person have a ‘well-founded fear 
of being persecuted’. Mechanisms have been developed in order to determine whether a 
person’s fear is well founded, such as through an examination of the conditions in the home 
country, that can be both subjectively and objectively obtained.96 The UN Convention requires 
that such an assessment take a forward-looking appraisal of risk, as there is no mention of past 
persecution; however, past persecution may arguably serve as evidence as to the likelihood of 
future persecution.97 Additionally, the person must be fleeing from persecution and not just 
ordinary harm [own emphasis]. There are listed grounds of persecution, as well as limitations 
on who the agents of persecution should be. A person is also required to be outside his or her 
country of nationality. This limitation is linked to states’ unwillingness to overstep on to 
another state’s sovereignty by assisting those who are still within their country of nationality.98 
Refugees must also show that they are unwilling or unable to obtain protection from their own 
state or that their state is unwilling/unable to protect them.99  
While the definition of a refugee is subject to much debate, this paper will not delve 
into the full depth of the definition as its main purpose is to examine when a state may reject 
refugees on the basis of national security.100 Thus, this paper will work on the assumption that 
states are rejecting those who fall within the refugee definition. Importantly, however, it should 
be noted that one may be a classed as a refugee without having been recognised as a refugee 
by any state – provided one meets the requirements in the UN Convention.101 Notably, Article 
31 of the UN Convention provides that states shall not penalise refugees for illegal entry or 
presence in their territory.102 It requires refugees to make an asylum application without delay, 
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to come directly from their country of origin, and to possess just cause in making their 
application.103 Therefore, states have a duty to refrain from convicting refugees for breach of 
any immigration laws as they are protected by the UN Convention on arrival from any territory. 
However, states may institute proceedings.104 
 
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which was subsequently replaced by the African 
Union (AU), drafted a refugee convention in 1969.105 This convention’s definition of a refugee, 
while based on that of the UN Convention, made some very important modifications. Most 
notable is that of Article 1(2), which states that: 
2. The term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either 
part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place 
of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of 
origin or nationality.106 
 
Thus, this definition provides refugee status to those fleeing any man-made disaster, whether 
or not they can be held to be fleeing persecution. This definition takes into account many of 
the problems and crises present in the third world, which were not accounted for in the UN 
Convention.  
Primarily, this definition takes account of situations in which the government of a state 
has lost authority due to external aggression, foreign domination or occupation – and that 
people still deserve protection from the anticipated harm despite that harm being inflicted by a 
foreign power.107 Secondly, this definition accounts for group disenfranchisement where 
persons flee due to broad events or phenomena instead of as a result of specific persecution on 
a listed ground. Thus, this definition encompasses those fleeing a significant disruption to the 
public order and does not require them to prove that they are fleeing persecution that is 
specifically linked to their personal status.108 Additionally, the OAU definition provides 
protection to those fleeing a severe disruption to public order ‘in either part or the whole’ of 
the country.109 This, too, is different from the assumption found in the UN Convention that a 
person should flee to a ‘safe’ part of their country of origin before fleeing to another country. 
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However, such an assumption is illogical in that it may, in many cases, be easier and cheaper 
to travel to a neighbouring state than across one’s own state. Additionally, one must consider 
that it may be impossible for a person to migrate to a ‘safe’ area of his or her own country, and 
even so, that the supposed safeness of such areas may be unreliable.110  
The OAU Convention definition is relevant to this paper as it highlights some of the 
limitations of the UN Convention. Additionally, it is considered to be one of the most 
influential conceptual standards of refugee status and has provided a basis for many subsequent 
treaty definitions of refugees.111 Thus, it is important that this paper take note of this definition 
when performing its analysis.  
(b) Law of the United States 
Before the 1950s, the U.S. had no statute that generally regulated the admission of refugees. 
Some ad hoc legislation was passed by Congress in the 1950s and 60s; however this was 
specifically as a response to a certain crisis.112 The Attorney General of the U.S. also had a 
power to parole a group of refugees into the U.S. under the INA §212(d)(5).113 The parole 
power, however, was insufficient, as there were no distinct criteria for admission and no 
procedural recourse if parole was denied.114 Additionally, to be paroled into the U.S. was not 
equivalent to being admitted; thus, a person who was ‘paroled in’ could be removed from the 
country at any time for any reason.115  
In 1968, the U.S. acceded to the 1967 Protocol. Twelve years later, after finding their 
domestic legislation to be inadequate to handle the increasing number of refugees seeking 
admission, the Refugee Act of 1980116 was enacted by Congress. The definition of a refugee 
can be found in §101(a)(42) of the INA,117 and was modelled on Article 1 of UN Convention. 
It includes the requirements that refugees be outside of their country of origin; be unable or 
unwilling to return to that country; and be unable or unwilling to avail themselves to the 
protection of that country as a result of a well-founded fear of persecution on one of the listed 
grounds. These grounds are race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group 
or political opinion. This section also includes an exclusion from the definition of a refugee for 
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those ‘who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participates in the persecution of any person 
on account of “one of the listed grounds”’.118  
Additionally, the 1980 Refugee Act added §207(a) to the INA. This section requires 
that the President of the United States make an annual decision regarding how many refugees 
are to be admitted during the forthcoming fiscal year.119 This Presidential determination must 
also specify how this number is to be allocated among refugees from various countries and 
geographic areas.120 In addition, there is no limit on how high or low this number may be – and 
§207(b) provides the President with the authorisation to increase the number of refugees to be 
admitted, should an unexpected emergency situation arise.121 However, acting as a check on 
this power, the President is required by §207(a)(1, 2, 3) and §207(b) to participate in 
‘appropriate consultation’ with Congress before making any of the aforementioned 
determinations.122  
Section 208 of the INA contains the main asylum provisions. It provides for the 
procedure of asylum applications, eligibility for asylum, the burden of proof, exceptions and 
the rights afforded to those granted asylum status.123 Notably, the INA contains a one-year time 
limit, requiring asylum seekers to apply for asylum within one year of their arrival in the U.S.124 
This limit is not contained in the UN Convention, and is arguably harsh on arriving refugees, 
who may have a fear of law enforcement and an ignorance of the laws and their rights. 
Additionally, in §208(2)(A) the Article 1F exceptions and the Article 33(2) exceptions from 
the UN Convention are jointly mentioned as exceptions to refugee status in the U.S. This is 
unusual as Article 1F and Article 33(2) of the UN Convention are different in their effect on 
the status of refugees under international law, which will be explained in greater detail in 
Chapter three. Finally, in §212(d)(5)(B) Congress prevented the Attorney General from 
paroling refugees into the U.S. unless there were ‘compelling reasons in the public interest with 
respect to that particular alien’ in order to encourage the use of the procedures found in §208.125 
The principle of non-refoulement, as mentioned in the Literature Review, can be found 
in §241(b)(3)(A) of the INA, which states: 
(A) In general. –Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), [the Secretary of Homeland 
Security] may not remove an alien to a country if the [Secretary] decides that the alien’s 
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life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.126 
 
The principle of non-refoulement is renamed in U.S. law as ‘withholding of removal’. In 
§241(b)(3)(B), discussed further in Chapter four, the INA again combines the exception 
provisions found in Article 1F and Article 33(2) of the UN Convention, narrowing refugees’ 
access to this form of relief. Thus, U.S. domestic refugee law is already more restrictive than 
that of the international refugee law.  
The U.S. domestic refugee legislation, like that of international law, has to perform a 
balancing act between national self-interest (state sovereignty) and humanitarian/human rights 
policies.127 This paper is aimed at examining international refugee law, with a subsequent case 
study on the actions of the U.S. However, it will be examining the actions of the U.S. through 
the lens of international refugee law and not that of domestic U.S. legislation. Thus, while it is 
important to take note of how the UN Convention has been incorporated into the United States’ 
domestic legislation, this legislation will not form the basis of this paper’s analysis. In the 
following section, this paper will examine the extent to which the UN Convention is binding 
on nation states – and specifically, on the United States. 
 
II. Binding Nature of the UN Convention  
The UN Convention is an international treaty and as such, a source of international law.128 
However, unlike national law, treaties are only binding on the basis of consent. Nevertheless, 
they are one of the only means by which a state may deliberately and consciously create binding 
international legal obligations for itself.129 Treaties, such as the UN Convention, are able to 
create binding rights and obligations that are separate and distinct from any national law.130 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties131 provides the foundational document for all 
international treaties. In order for a state to be bound by a treaty, the state must first give its 
consent132 to be bound, and secondly, the treaty must have entered into force.133 Consent takes 
place through ‘signature’ and ‘ratification’. In most instances, only once a state has ratified a 
treaty is it bound by that treaty.134 Article 24 of the Vienna Convention states that a treaty will 
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enter into force “in such manner and upon such date as it may provide or as the negotiating 
states may agree.”135 For example, the UN Convention was signed in July 1951; however, it 
only entered into force in April 1954.  
Most importantly, Article 26 of the Vienna Convention states that “[e]very treaty in 
force is binding in good faith upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith.”136 This rule is in itself a part of customary international law. In addition, Article 27 of 
the Vienna Convention specifies that a state may not invoke the dictates of national law, as a 
reason to excuse its failure to perform a treaty obligation.137 Thus, all states that are signatories 
to the UN Convention and Protocol, and who have subsequently ratified the UN Convention, 
are bound in international law by its provisions.138 
The United States signed and ratified the protocol and is thus bound by the 1951 UN 
Convention. Therefore, the U.S. is obligated under international law to respect all the rights 
afforded to refugees under the convention.139 However, the U.S. domestic law dictates the 
internal allocation of responsibility for the implementation of their international legal 
obligations.140 Under domestic U.S. law, there is a distinction between international treaties 
and agreements which are, and are not, self-executing. Treaties that are self-executing and not 
self-executing both create binding international legal obligations; however, those which are 
self-executing also create binding national law without requiring any form of implementing 
legislation. The obligations flowing from treaties which are not self-executing are not 
automatically enforceable in domestic U.S. courts until implementing legislation has been 
enacted by Congress.141 Once such legislation has been enacted, the legal obligations which 
follow are usually said to flow from the statute and not from the international treaty.142  
According to the U.S. courts, the 1967 Protocol is non-self-executing.143 In the case in 
point, Matter of D-J,144 the Attorney General declared the protocol to be a non-self-executing 
treaty; however, while such a treaty would thus not be enforceable in a domestic U.S. court, he 
did not discuss why the U.S. would not be bound by its treaty obligations internationally.145 
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While the non-refoulement obligation, found in Article 33 of the UN Convention, was 
implemented into U.S. law via the 1980 Refugee Act, it did not implement any of the other 
rights afforded to refugees.146 Thus, it is arguable that the legislation in the U.S. is insufficient 
in meeting its obligations under the UN Convention.147  
This paper will examine the obligations imposed on states under international law, and 
specifically in the U.S. Thus, it is important to note the extent to which the U.S. courts feel that 
they are bound and obligated to follow the UN Convention. However, even though the U.S. 
courts deem themselves not to be bound internally by their obligations under the UN 
Convention, they have yet to provide a reason as to why they would not be bound by their 
obligations under the UN Convention on the international plane. 
 
III. Customary International Law 
Customary International Law is a source of international law that is based on the practices of 
states.148 Thus, the international actions of states may eventually give rise to binding 
international law. It is a dynamic source of law which can be universal, regional or bilateral.149 
There are two main elements required for a practice to become customary international law. 
The first can be found in Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute,150 which requires that there be a 
“general practice accepted by law.” The second element can be found in the Asylum case,151 
which, requires that (of the practice) there be “constant and uniform usage, accepted as law.” 
Thus, customary law can be derived from general, consistent and uniform state practice in 
combination with the belief by states that such practice is mandatory (opinio juris).152 It is 
possible that treaties may change or replace aspects of customary international law; however, 
one should note that there are certain fundamental rules in customary law which cannot be 
changed by any treaty.153  
The principle of non-refoulement is a rule of customary international law.154 However, 
given the consensus on the reach of the mandate of the UNHCR and other refugee accords, 
Hathaway considers the possibility that there may be an expanded refugee concept in 
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customary international law.155 Specifically, he refers to the arguments put forward by Guy 
Goodwin-Gil156 regarding the principle of non-refoulement, holding that this principle may 
place an obligation on states not to return those who are outside the reach of the UN Convention 
refugee definition − and who will face harm and a lack of government protection.157  
However, he also takes into account the arguments of Kay Hailbronner,158 who argues 
that there is both insufficient uniform state practice and opinio juris to hold that refugees, who 
do not fall within the UN Convention definition, have such international rights.159 He argues 
that most international practice is institutional practice by the UNHCR and thus cannot form 
binding obligations on states. Additionally, as will be discussed in this paper, many developed 
and developing states have rejected refugees en masse, and have formed countless mechanisms 
to deal with the numbers of refugees seeking asylum.160 Nevertheless, Hailbronner does not 
take into account the global consensus of states seeking to determine a means to assess the 
claims of asylum seekers outside of the UN Convention definition, but who are within or at the 
borders of such states.161  
Hathaway ultimately concluded that the principle of non-refoulement, regarding those 
outside of the refugee definition, had not become a part of customary international law. 
However, in more recent sources, it is clearly held that the principle of non-refoulement itself 
is a part of customary international law.162  
Nevertheless, the existence of the principle of non-refoulement as a jus cogens norm 
will have significant implications on the interpretation of the Article 33(2) exceptions to the 
principle, particularly with regard to national security.163 Specifically, the U.S. has previously 
relied on Article 33(2) to enact and prioritise anti-terrorism legislation above that of refugee 
rights and protections.164 Alice Farmer argues that, while the principle of non-refoulement has 
achieved the status of customary international law through general acceptance, the exceptions 
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to this principle have not.165 In the following chapter this paper will consider when a state may 
exclude refugees on the basis of national security. Thus, it is necessary that it take into account 
the effect of the existence of refugee protection under international law as this will have an 
effect on the scope of such protections, in particular with regard to how they may be employed 
by the United States. 
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Chapter Three  
I. National Security Exceptions under the UN Convention 
(a) Defining ‘National Security’ 
Prior to analysing the provisions under international law which provide for the rejection of 
refugees on the basis of national security, it is necessary to define the term ‘national security’ 
– for “if we cannot define national security, we are less apt to uphold and defend it.”166 In the 
context of immigration and refugee law, national security should not be interpreted in an overly 
broad fashion so as to encompass every possible aspect of a nation’s interest; however, it also 
cannot be overly limited, and thus fail to account for critical issues.167  
The UN Convention was drafted soon after the conclusion of the World War II. Thus, 
nation states were concerned that war criminals not be protected under international refugee 
law and that such states could deny admission to criminals who could pose a danger to their 
national security and the public order.168 The UNHCR, respecting state sovereignty, provided 
states with discretion as to whether to apply the exclusion clauses found in Article 1F. 
Nevertheless, in light of the potential gravity of the consequences of exclusion, the UNHCR 
Handbook requires that the exclusion clauses be interpreted restrictively.169  
While there is no single, official, legal definition of national security170, it is nonetheless 
a well-defined term.171 It has been defined as encompassing anything which poses a threat to a 
country’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, government, independence, constitution, external 
peace, armed forces, war potential or military installations.172  
With regard to the UN Convention, it was initially proposed by the U.K. representative 
to the ad hoc committee that the convention include an article that would provide states with 
the ability to derogate from any provision – only as was necessary – in the interests of national 
security.173 Alternatively, it was suggested that a state may apply any provisional measure to a 
refugee on account of their nationality until such measure was no longer necessary in terms of 
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national security.174 The committee agreed that such an article should be included, but opted 
for one that was more along the lines of the second option. However, the provision was made 
to be more restrictive; for example, ‘a refugee’ was changed to ‘a particular person’, and so, 
provisional measures could only be applied to individual persons and could not be applied 
generally to groups of refugees.175 It is also relevant to note that an asylum seeker or migrant 
could be considered a threat to national security even where they had not committed any 
specific crime.176 
National security, within the context of the U.S., is defined in the INA as the national 
defence, economic interests, or foreign relations of the U.S.177 However, how national security 
has been interpreted has been accomplished in various ways under the different presidencies. 
Under President Barack Obama, national security included the security of U.S. allies and 
partners.178 Under President George W. Bush, national security was more focused on protection 
of the territorial homeland of the U.S. and the American people, with particular concern for the 
United States’ global military interests and the economy.179 President Bill Clinton followed a 
much broader definition of national security, which could potentially even encompass present 
day climate change due to references to the protection of “quality of life”.180 
Thus, with regard to refugee law, national security can be argued to concern instances 
where the admittance of a refugee(s) would threaten the safety, national interests, defence, 
infrastructure, peace and people of a country, in addition to many of the factors already stated. 
While there are many considerations that fall under the term of ‘national security’, this term 
should be interpreted restrictively as shall be discussed below. 
(b) Article 1F 
(i) Overview 
Article 1F of the 1951 UN Convention contains what is commonly referred to as the ‘exclusion 
clauses’. These provisions are intended to exclude those who would fall within the refugee 
definition from the benefits of protection under the UN Convention.181 Article 1F states: 
F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there 
are serious reasons for considering that: 
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(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, 
as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect 
of such crimes; 
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior 
to his admission to that country as a refugee; 
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations. 
 
The purpose of this article was to exclude those who, despite qualifying as a refugee, were 
deemed undeserving of the benefits afforded with refugee status. Such persons are undeserving 
because there are ‘serious reasons for considering’ that they have committed crimes against 
peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity, a serious non-political crime outside of the country 
of refuge, or are guilty of another act that is contrary to the principles and purposes of the 
UN.182 Additionally, this section is aimed at preventing such persons from using the protections 
of international refugee law in order to avoid accountability for their actions.183 The exclusion 
clauses provided for in Article 1F are exhaustive and cannot be amended or modified; however, 
they are subject to interpretation. Nevertheless, the UNHCR has stated that, with consideration 
to the severity of the consequences of exclusion, the provisions of Article 1F should be 
interpreted restrictively in light of the humanitarian purpose and character of the UN 
Convention.184  
Looking specifically at the provisions contained in Article 1F, only section (b) is limited 
in terms of temporal and geographic scope. It requires that the non-political crime must have 
been committed before the individual seeks admission, and the crime committed outside of the 
country of refuge. Thus, by implication, Article 1F(a) and (c) are not restricted by when or 
where the acts listed were committed. Therefore, refugee status may even be revoked in 
instances where a recognised refugee engages in such acts after their admission into the country 
of refuge.185 One should note that ‘admission’ in the context of the exclusion clauses merely 
means physical presence in the country of refuge.186 
Refugee status can be cancelled under the principles of administrative law where, for 
instance, it has been discovered that the basis on which the decision was made was absent in 
the first place. This could be where, had all the facts been known and considered, the asylum 
seeker would not have met the definition of a refugee or where one of the exclusion clauses 
would have applied. However, it is important to note that cancellation in such a case would 
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only apply to facts that were present at the time of the determination; subsequent conduct 
should not be considered.187 Cancellation of refugee status should also be differentiated from 
withdrawal of protection under Articles 32 and 33 of the UN Convention. Cancellation applies 
where refugee status was awarded erroneously − where Article 32 and 33 withdraw protection 
from properly recognised refugees.188 
Refugees are expected to follow the laws and regulations of the country in which they 
seek refuge under Article 2 of the UN Convention. Thus, should they commit crimes in the 
country of refuge, they would be liable for domestic criminal prosecution. In specific 
circumstances, as will be discussed below, a refugee may be expelled or removed from a 
country; however, such action does not deprive the individual of status as a refugee. 
Nevertheless, should a refugee engage in conduct that would fall within Article 1F(a) or (c), it 
is likely that the exclusion clauses would be triggered, and refugee status may subsequently be 
revoked.189  
Importantly, it should be noted that the determination as to whether the exclusion 
clauses apply falls within the competence of the state in which the claimant seeks refuge. 
However, when a state finds that an exclusion clause applies, that state is not obliged to expel 
the individual and may choose to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over that person. The state 
may also have obligations under extradition treaties with regard to the individual, but most 
importantly, that person would no longer fall within the scope of the UNHCR.190 
(ii) Specifics of the Exclusion Clauses 
Article 1F(a) specifically concerns the exclusion of individuals of whom there are serious 
reasons for considering have committed “a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against 
humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of 
such crimes.”191 The most widely accepted definitions of these crimes can be found in the 
statutes of the International Criminal Court (ICC), specifically in Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome 
Statute.192 However, one can only find a definition of a crime against peace in the London 
Charter,193 in which such a crime arises from the “planning, preparation, initiation or waging 
of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, 
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or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the 
foregoing.”194 Elements of this definition were subsequently incorporated into the principles 
and purposes of the UN Charter.195 Such crimes are generally considered to be those of the 
most heinous nature, and as such, one would expect that other international instruments, such 
as the CAT and Genocide Convention, will be relevant in the interpretation of this exclusion 
clause.196  
Article 1F(b) concerns serious non-political crimes committed outside of the country 
of refuge prior to seeking admission. Under this exclusion clause, the gravity of the crime in 
question should be assessed against international standards and not only against the domestic 
legislation. Additionally, the seriousness of the crime should be assessed with concern to the 
nature of the act, the harm inflicted, the type of procedure used in prosecution, the nature of 
the penalty as well as consideration for how other jurisdictions assess the seriousness of such 
a crime.197 Serious crimes would include murder, arson, rape and armed robbery, and could 
also encompass any crime in which a deadly weapon was used, or one which caused significant 
injury.198  
The requirement that the crime be non-political probably stems from the perceived 
justifiability of crimes committed for a political cause against an oppressive regime, in addition 
to instances where the domestic law of a country criminalises certain political acts. A state, 
when assessing whether a crime is non-political, should consider the motives behind the act 
and whether the predominant motivation was one of personal gain (or another).199 Additionally, 
in circumstances where one is unable to establish a clear link between the crime and an alleged 
political motive or where the criminal act was vastly disproportionate from the alleged political 
objective, then a non-political motive may be considered predominant.200 Thus, a state should 
take into account the context, method, proportionality and motivation behind a crime in order 
to evaluate whether it is of a political or non-political nature. Finally, a potentially justifiable 
political crime should be congruent with human rights and fundamental freedoms.201  
Article 1F(c) excludes those who are “guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations,”202 which can be found in Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter. 
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However, these articles only provide broad, general terms which do not specify the types of 
crimes which would result in exclusion under Article 1F(c).203 It is likely that this section was 
purposefully drafted to be broad so as to encompass future conduct that could not be conceived 
at the time of drafting. Nevertheless, it is recommended that Article 1F(b) be read narrowly in 
order to avoid misuse by states.204  
The UNHCR has also stated that this section only includes crimes which fundamentally 
violate the principles and purposes of the United Nations, setting a high threshold for the 
gravity of the relevant conduct [own emphasis]. In particular, a state should take into 
consideration how the act was organised, the objectives in the long term, its international 
impact, as well as potential future implications for peace and security internationally.205 Thus, 
it is likely that Article 1F(c) will only apply to politically or militarily high-ranking persons. 
This is because such persons would be in a high enough position of power in a country or 
similar state entity that would render them capable of violating these provisions.206  
Nevertheless, as will be discussed subsequently, there are arguments that persons who 
commit acts of terrorism should fall within the scope of Article 1F(c), as such acts are capable 
of threatening international peace and security and are considered to be contrary to the 
principles and purposes of the United Nations. However, it is recommended by academics and 
organisations such as the UNHCR, that states should not focus on the label of ‘terrorist’ when 
considering the exclusion clauses, but rather on the specific terrorist ‘acts’ committed by the 
individual in question.207 Such acts should then be assessed in terms of their gravity, whether 
they had an international impact and whether the act had implications regarding international 
peace and security. Notably, individual responsibility is a major factor to be considered in such 
instances.208  
(iii) National Security and Terrorism 
There is no specific mention of national security in Article 1F; thus, this provision cannot at 
face value be used to exclude an asylum seeker on the basis of national security. Nevertheless, 
it is likely that individuals who have committed the acts mentioned in Article 1F would be 
considered a threat to a nation’s security. Currently, national security concerns are often tied 
to issues of terrorism, specifically regarding refugee and immigration law. The exclusion 
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clauses make no specific mention of terrorism, and thus it is necessary to consider how 
terrorism (as a threat to national security) would fit in with Article 1F. 
Regarding Article 1F(a), it is unlikely that a terrorist act would fall into the category of 
a crime against peace (or a crime of aggression), as such a crime would generally involve an 
ad bellum violation by a state official, instead of one concerning the methods and means of the 
violence.209 However, should a terrorist act be committed during an armed conflict it could fall 
within the definition of a war crime, and thus, such a person could be excluded under Article 
1F(a). Additionally, terrorism could also constitute a crime against humanity, provided that it 
is a widespread and systematic attack on a civilian population, and the perpetrator has the 
requisite knowledge component.210 Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, the exclusion 
clauses require individual responsibility; thus, there must be serious reasons for considering 
that the asylum seeker has committed the terrorist act in question or made a substantial 
contribution towards it.211  
Terrorist acts, while they may claim to be for political motivations, are usually entirely 
disproportionate to the ends sought. Thus, an individual who has committed a terrorist act 
would more readily be excluded under Article 1F(b).212 Regarding when such an act could be 
considered political, the House of Lords in T v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
held that: “Homicide, assassination and murder, is one of the most heinous crimes. It can only 
be justified where no other method exists of protecting the final rights of humanity.”213 
Therefore, where there are serious reasons for considering that an individual, who otherwise 
meets the definition of a refugee under the UN Convention, has committed a terrorist act (or 
acts) outside of the country of refuge prior to seeking admission, would be excludable under 
Article 1F(b). However, it would be necessary to carefully assess whether the specific acts 
concerned reach the gravity requirement and the requisite level of seriousness in order to fall 
under Article 1F(b).214  
Nevertheless, there is also jurisprudence indicating that persons who commit terrorist 
acts may also be excludable under Article 1F(c) as a result of being “guilty of acts contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”215 When considering the travaux 
préparatoires of the UN Convention, one is able to recognise a connection between Article 
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1F(c) and Article 14(2) of the UDHR.216 Article 14(2) stipulates the right to seek asylum from 
persecution ‘may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-
political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations’.217 
Consequently, an individual who has violated fundamental human rights, such as through a 
terrorist act, should not be afforded protection under the UN Convention. In addition, as the 
UN Security Council has stated that it considers terrorism to be against the purposes and 
principles of the UN, and a threat to international peace and security,218 it would seem 
reasonable to include terrorism within the scope of Article 1F(c).219  
Nonetheless, as previously stated, the application of Article 1F(c) would generally be 
to those in a position of power – thus perhaps only to the leaders of terrorist organisations.220 
Despite this, Article 1F(c) has been applied to individuals of a lower level who have engaged 
in terrorist activities.221 Consequently, one would seek to avoid too close an association 
between terrorism and asylum seekers, in order to prevent states from using the label of 
‘terrorism’ in order to suppress the legitimate political activities of their opponents.222 Thus, 
Article 1F(c) should be interpreted and defined narrowly in order to protect the institution of 
international refugee law.223 Therefore, as previously stated, terrorist acts should only render 
an individual excludable under Article 1F(c) where such acts have threatened international 
peace and security.224  
In order to assess the individual responsibility of the asylum seeker regarding terrorist 
activities or where the applicant is a member of a terrorist organisation, certain factors should 
be considered. The case of JS (Sri Lanka)225 from the U.K. provided a list of seven such factors. 
First, a state should consider the nature and importance of the alleged terrorist organisation, 
and specifically, the section of the organisation to which the applicant was connected. 
Secondly, a state should consider whether and by whom the organisation was prohibited or 
deemed a terrorist organisation. Thirdly, it should be noted how the applicant was recruited 
and fourthly, how long the asylum seeker remained in the organisation and whether they had 
any opportunities to leave.  
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Fifthly, a state should consider what the position, standing or rank the asylum seeker 
had in the organisation, as well as their level of influence. Sixthly, a state should investigate 
and enquire into the applicant’s knowledge of the activities and crimes of the organisation – an 
examination of the mens rea component. Seventhly, and finally, the personal role and level of 
involvement of the asylum seeker in the organisation should be considered. In particular, a 
state should take note of the contributions made by the individual in the commission of any 
international crimes.226 Therefore, for the exclusion clauses under Article 1F to apply, a state 
would need to be able to make a connection between the asylum seeker and a terrorist crime, 
with specific reference to evidentiary facts.227  
It is also important to consider the defences available to an individual whom the state 
is trying to exclude under Article 1F. Following the provisions of the Rome Statute,228 and in 
particular Articles 31-33, an asylum seeker may employ the defence of duress, mental disease 
or defect, self-defence, mistake of fact, involuntary intoxication, or certain mistakes of law.229 
In very rare instances, the defence of superior orders may also be accepted.230 In general, the 
burden of proof in asylum cases is shared between the asylum seeker and the state; however, 
where a state seeks to exclude an individual under Article 1F, the burden shifts to the state to 
justify the exclusion.231 This aligns with the legal principle that the person or state making a 
claim should bear the burden to prove that claim. Nevertheless, where an individual has been 
indicted by an international criminal tribunal or court, a rebuttable presumption of excludability 
would be created against the applicant. Presence on a terrorist suspect list or membership in a 
terrorist organisation, however, does not generally result such a presumption.232 
If a state wanted to exclude a refugee for reasons of national security, it could not do 
so under Article 1F unless such person had already committed one of the required acts. An 
alleged terrorist may be considered a threat to national security; however, unless they have 
committed one of the acts that fall within Article 1F, they cannot be excluded under this 
provision. Article 1F is not an anti-terrorism provision. Simply bearing the label of ‘terrorist’ 
due to placement on a ‘terrorism watch-list’, or being a member of a terrorist organisation, 
cannot and should not automatically lead to exclusion under these clauses.233 However, such 
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labelling or membership may lead to an investigation into the applicability of the exclusion 
clauses.234  
The requirement of ‘serious reasons’ sets the standard of proof at a higher threshold 
than a ‘reasonable suspicion’ and indeed, higher than a ‘balance of probabilities’; however, the 
criminal standard of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ would be too great a burden. It is not 
necessary that the asylum seeker should be or have been formally charged or convicted.235 
Thus, the standard of proof should lie somewhere between a balance of probabilities and 
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to protect the integrity of the international refugee regime 
and to ensure that bona fide refugees are not unjustifiably excluded.236  
National security is explicitly mentioned in Article 33(2) as an exception to the 
principle of non-refoulement. However, one cannot take the national security exception from 
Article 33 and impute it into Article 1F as these provisions are distinct and were enacted for 
separate purposes. Article 1F forms a part of the definition of a refugee, and thus an applicant 
who falls within these exclusion clauses does not obtain refugee status. Article 33(2) does not 
provide a basis for exclusion from refugee protection.237 Whereas Article 1F aims to prevent 
the international refugee regime from awarding refugee status to those who are undeserving of 
protection, Article 33(2) aims to protect the security of refugee-receiving states. Article 33(2) 
is thus concerned with the treatment of recognised refugees and not with the recognition of 
refugees [own emphasis]. It only withdraws the protection against refoulement for a recognised 
refugee where such person has been deemed a danger to national security in the host state.238 
Thus, if a state were to exclude an asylum seeker on the basis of national security under the 
provisions of Article 1F, such an act would run against the object and purpose of Article 1F as 
well as the conceptual framework of the UN Convention.239 
Therefore, it is conceivable that there could be a situation in which a state is confronted 
with an asylum seeker whom it perceives is a threat to national security, but who has not 
committed any acts that would result in their exclusion under Article 1F. In such circumstances, 
provided the applicant meets the definition of a refugee, a state may not exclude the refugee 
for national security reasons under Article 1F. However, it is possible that the state may be able 
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to remove the refugee from their territory under the exception to non-refoulement as found in 
Article 33(2), as shall be considered in the next section.  
(c) Article 33(2) 
The principle of non-refoulement is contained in Article 33 of the UN Convention.240 This 
provision aims at preventing states from returning individuals to a country in which they may 
suffer persecution. Article 33(2) provides the only exceptions to this principle under the UN 
Convention. As discussed above, the principle of non-refoulement has been held to have 
reached the level of customary international law and thus, the exceptions to it should be 
considered increasingly narrowly.241 Additionally, as previously stated, Article 33(2) is not a 
ground for terminating or excluding an asylum seeker from refugee status.  
Specifically, Article 33(1) prohibits states (or entities falling within a state’s 
responsibility)242 from returning or expelling refugees in any manner whatsoever. Thus, no 
matter the means or procedure a state follows in order to return a refugee, be it expulsion, 
extradition, rejection, return, deportation etc., it will not prevent them from violating the 
principle of non-refoulement.243 Additionally, refugees may not be returned to the ‘frontiers of 
territories where their life or freedom would be threatened’. As such, the principle of non-
refoulement applies not only to the state of origin of the refugee, but to any state in which their 
life or freedom would be threatened [own emphasis].244 Further, rejection at the frontier could 
constitute refoulement. Where a state is unwilling to grant asylum to an individual, it may not 
take a course of action that would result in such an individual being returned to a territory 
where they may face persecution. The state must take another course of action such as 
removing the asylum seeker to a safe third country or perhaps to provide temporary 
protection.245 
The duty of non-refoulement is owed to a refugee from the moment they enter a 
country; thus, it applies to all asylum seekers, even before a status determination is made. The 
definition of a refugee in Article 1A(2) of the UN Convention does not require a refugee to 
have been formally recognised as having a well-founded fear of persecution [own emphasis].246 
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The principle of non-refoulement and its exceptions will apply to such persons as they are to 
be considered prima facie refugees. As such, a state cannot return them to their state of origin 
or to any other country where their life or freedom will be in danger. This would include states 
in which the individual would have a well-founded fear of persecution, a risk of torture or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or any other threat to their life, liberty or physical 
integrity.247 In addition, the application of Article 33(1) will require an examination of the 
individual circumstances in each case, even in instances of mass influx.248  
 
With regard to Article 33(2), it should first be noted that this section contains a higher threshold 
requirement than found in Article 1F. Additionally, Article 33(2) relies on a state’s 
consideration of a future threat from the individual rather than basing their determination on 
previously committed acts.249 Thus, should the past acts of a refugee be insufficient to justify 
the application of the exclusion clauses under Article 1F, it would also be unlikely that such 
person would meet the higher threshold of the Article 33(2) exception.250 Article 33(2) contains 
an exception regarding a refugee who has been ‘convicted by a final judgment of a particularly 
serious crime, [and] constitutes a danger to the community’. Thus, merely being accused of a 
crime, or the suspicion of having committed a crime, or even being prosecuted for a crime 
would not be sufficient under this section.251 Only where a refugee has been convicted by a 
final judgment − i.e. a judgment from which there is no possibility of appeal − will this 
exception apply. The exception requires that the conviction be for a particularly serious crime; 
thus, as previously discussed, only certain major crimes will warrant the use of this part of the 
exception clause.252  
This exception is also forward looking, thus subsequent to a conviction by final 
judgment of a serious crime, an assessment of the danger to the community (of the country of 
refuge) would still need to be made.253 The term ‘danger’ should be interpreted to constitute a 
particularly serious danger in light of the circumstances surrounding the conviction, length of 
time since the conviction and other relevant facts.254 Such a crime may have been committed 
before or subsequent to admission as a refugee; however, as the exclusion clause in Article 
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1F(b) should apply to situations where such crimes were committed prior to admission, it is 
likely that Article 33(2) is aimed at convictions for particularly serious crimes that were 
committed after admission as a refugee [own emphasis].255  
The exception to the principle of non-refoulement under Article 33(2) also specifically 
allows states to return refugees – even to countries where they may face persecution, where 
there are reasonable grounds for regarding the refugee as a danger to national security. Past 
conduct may be relevant in assessing the future risk that an individual may pose to national 
security; however, the primary focus should be on prospective threats to national security.256 
The national security exception in Article 33(2) is also specific to the country of refuge. Thus, 
while states are not limited under the UN Convention to take action within their own territory 
or jurisdiction to secure national security interests of other states, such actions may not include 
refoulement.257  
Unlike the exception of having been convicted of a serious crime, the national security 
exception only requires that there be ‘reasonable grounds’ for considering that the individual 
is a danger to national security.258 Article 33(2) does not specifically identify any of the kinds 
of acts which would potentially trigger this exception, nor what is necessary to prove that an 
individual is a danger to national security. However, the term ‘reasonable’ implies that states 
may not act arbitrarily and should base their conclusions on evidentiary facts.259 The ‘danger’ 
posed should also be weighed against the serious consequences faced by the refugee on 
refoulement, indicating that this section requires that the danger be very serious, especially 
since the threshold of danger in this section is higher than that in Article 1F.260 Examples of 
such acts were espoused by Grahl-Madsen as including, “espionage, sabotage of military 
installations and terrorist activities.”261  
 
Once again, a state should always consider the individual circumstances of a refugee when 
making an assessment – especially one which would result in a loss of protection. This 
requirement also ties in with the obligation on states to ensure that there is an actual connection 
between the individual concerned and the threat to national security.262 Additionally, the 
principle of proportionality must apply. Thus, states should take account of the seriousness of 
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the threat to national security, the likelihood and imminence of such a threat and whether such 
a threat would be alleviated or eliminated if the relevant individual was removed, the risk to 
the individual should they be ‘refouled’ and whether there is an alternative course of action 
which does not include refoulement.263  
Therefore, Article 33(2) provides states with a means to return refugees in instances 
where they pose a threat to national security. However, as in Article 1F, states may only return 
refugees and asylum seekers under limited circumstances. This section contains a specific 
reference to national security, where Article 1F did not; however as the threshold is higher, it 
would only be in rare and extreme circumstances that the Article 33(2) exceptions would apply. 
Additionally, there has been a trend against the use of the Article 33(2) exceptions, and there 
have even been arguments made that the exceptions should be entirely disregarded.264 
(i) Non-refoulement as a ‘Jus Cogens’ norm 
As discussed previously, the principle of non-refoulement has become a part of customary 
international law, arguably attaining the status of jus cogens. Alice Farmer argues that with this 
status the exceptions to the principle, which have not obtained customary law status, are 
limited.265 She argues that the exceptions should be interpreted and employed only in an 
extremely restricted manner in order to protect and preserve the jus cogens character of non-
refoulement. The exceptions to the norm, while setting a high threshold, are fairly broad. Thus, 
were a state to interpret them generously, the exceptions could undermine the principle of non-
refoulement as a jus cogens norm. In particular, while Article 1F should not be construed as an 
anti-terror provision, Article 33(2) specifically refers to national security, and may form the 
basis of anti-terror legislation.266  
As a jus cogens norm, the principle of non-refoulement should function in an absolute 
and unconditional manner; however, the exceptions take away from this by creating conditions. 
Additionally, jus cogens norms form part of the international public order, superseding treaty 
law; thus, the exceptions in Article 33(2) create a conflict between the UN Convention and the 
international public order.267 Thus the prevalence and scope of these exceptions should be 
considered. Taken from a human rights context, Erika de Wet states that: “As these rights by 
their very nature are directed at the protection of individuals within the territory of state parties, 
as opposed to regulating the relationship between states, one is forced to rethink the scope of 
                                                      
263 Ibid at 137-8. 
264 Ibid at 130-1. 
265 Farmer op cit note 163 at 28. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Ibid at 29. 
 44 
application of the concept of jus cogens.”268 Thus, jus cogens norms in a human rights context 
are necessary to protect individuals’ fundamental rights.  
The international community would perceive the breach of an international norm as a 
wrong, from which there should have been no derogation. However, despite the fact that one 
could technically argue that the exceptions to non-refoulement are not derogations, there is a 
correlation in the argument against the exceptions in such a context.269 Notably, such an 
argument would also align with Article 42 of the UN Convention which prohibits states from 
electing to make a reservation to Article 33. Indeed, the concept of the principle of non-
refoulement as jus cogens is powerful; it would prevent states from making individual or even 
regional objections to it. Should states be allowed to create broad anti-terror policies which 
undermine this norm, the purpose and power of jus cogens would be endangered.270 Farmer 
agrees with Lauterpacht and Bethlehem that the UN Convention should not be read without 
Article 33(2) and that removing the exceptions would be plainly inappropriate. However, there 
is consensus that as the principle of non-refoulement increasingly trends towards a jus cogens 
norm, so should the exceptions be read in an increasingly limited manner.271  
(ii) Non-entrée  
In order to avoid violating the principle of non-refoulement, increasingly many states have 
created policies and practices in which refugees are not returned, as is constituted by the 
principle of non-refoulement, but are refused entry to countries. The term ‘non-entrée’ 
originated in 1992; however, it is not formally defined.272 Non-entrée strategies generally aim 
at preventing asylum seekers from being able to access asylum and refugee status processes. 
An example would be the ‘interception’ programmes which seek to prevent persons who are 
in the process of migrating from reaching the country in which they intend to apply for 
asylum.273 Such policies often result in the intercepted persons being sent to a third state, which 
then may return such persons to their country of origin, even where to do so would constitute 
refoulement.274 Other policies relevant to non-entrée include visa requirements, carrier 
sanctions, requirements that refugees apply for asylum in the first safe country they enter, as 
well as regulations concerning international zones. 
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Refugee programmes in the global north are largely focused on resettlement. 
Recognised refugees apply to the UNHCR for resettlement and if approved, they will be able 
to travel to the U.S. or Europe to be resettled. This is a vastly different scenario than that faced 
by the bulk of refugees, who will flee their country to seek refuge in another state and apply 
for refugee status once they are at the border or have entered the desired destination state.275 
The question posed by Leirserson is whether non-entrée policies violate the principle of non-
refoulement.  
After considering the humanitarian and collaborative intent of the UN Convention to 
provide refuge and protection for refugees,276 she argues that such policies, especially where 
they apply indiscriminately to groups of refugees, cannot justifiably result in a broad-based 
refusal to provide access to asylum proceedings.277 To do so would certainly be a failure to 
consider an individual’s personal circumstances. Additionally, while states are not required to 
accept all refugees seeking admission, especially where an individual is perceived as a threat 
to national security, they cannot employ Article 33(2) to implement policies which intercept 
asylum seekers abroad under the guise of a blanket declaration that they are a security risk.278  
As such, non-entrée policies do not necessarily violate the principle of non-
refoulement, nor are they inherently illegal. However, certain policies have the potential of 
indirectly violating the principle of non-refoulement, which, as a jus cogens norm, would 
constitute an act against the international public order. Lauterpacht and Bethlehem also agree 
that a state’s responsibility includes its conduct – as well as those who act under its auspices – 
outside of its own territory.279 This was also confirmed in the Lotus case,280 in which the court 
held that the U.S., by intercepting refugees in the high seas and taking them aboard U.S. boats 
assumed jurisdiction and returning them constituted a violation of the principle of non-
refoulement. Notably, the South African Refugees Act holds rejection at the border to be 
synonymous with refoulement,281 indicating that there are states which do recognise that non-
entrée policies may result in refoulement. Thus, while some states may employ such non-entrée 
policies in order to prevent the admission of refugees where there are concerns for national 
security, they would nevertheless have a duty to ensure that such policies do not amount to a 
violation of the principle of non-refoulement.  
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(d) Article 32 
Article 32 of the UN Convention provides for the expulsion of an already lawfully present 
refugee. It states: 
  1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on 
grounds of national security or public order. 
“2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in 
accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of national 
security otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear 
himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the purpose before competent authority 
or a person or persons specially designated by the competent authority. 
“3. The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable period within which to 
seek legal admission into another country. The Contracting States reserve the right to 
apply during that period such internal measures as they deem necessary.282 
 
Expulsion is distinguished from the principle of non-refoulement, as expulsion under Article 
32 does not include return to the refugee’s country of origin or to any territory where the 
refugee’s life or freedom would be at risk.283 As with Article 33, the concept of ‘national 
security and public order’ is to be interpreted restrictively. Only grave threats to national 
security can warrant the exclusion of a lawfully present refugee. Additionally, in contrast to 
Article 33, Article 32 contains an explicit requirement that a decision to expel be made ‘in 
accordance with due process of law.’ However, it is nevertheless arguable that such a 
requirement should be read into Article 33 of the UN Convention.284 The section further details 
the specific procedures that are at minimum required in order for a state to expel a refugee.  
The UNHCR recognises in its ‘Note on Expulsion of Refugees’ that there is a balancing 
act at play between the national security of a state and the serious consequences faced by a 
refugee on expulsion. Refugees, by definition, cannot return to their home country and do not 
necessarily have an alternate country in which they could return should they be expelled. 
Therefore, expulsion has particularly harsh consequences for refugees as they do not have the 
entitlement to remain in any other country on a permanent basis.285 States are thus encouraged 
to take into account the personal circumstances of the refugee facing expulsion, and in 
particular the hardships that the refugee would face as a result of their status as a refugee. 
Therefore, consideration should be given to whether there are mitigating circumstances, or 
whether the refugee could be prosecuted under the state’s normal penal procedures.286  
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Article 32 is also a relatively unenforceable provision as it would be difficult to find 
another state that is willing to accept the expelled refugee, which is also a state in which the 
refugee will not be at risk of persecution.287 Expulsion orders may not be enforced unless there 
is another country willing to accept the refugee.288 Thus, the UNHCR recognises that a state 
may detain a refugee awaiting expulsion for a longer period than an ordinary alien facing 
expulsion. However, it urges that detention not be prolonged unduly.289  
Therefore, as in Article 33, while Article 32 does not result in the loss of refugee status, 
it does provide a state with a means to expel a refugee on the basis of national security. 
However, Article 32 does not absolve a state of its obligations under the principle of non-
refoulement in Article 33. Nevertheless, should a state, after following the procedures required 
by Article 32, find that a refugee should be expelled on reasons of national security, it is likely 
that the national security exception in Article 33(2) will also be met, and thus a state may even 
return a refugee to a territory in which their life or freedom is threatened.290 Notably, Article 
32(3) requires states to delay expulsion in order to provide refugees with the opportunity to 
pursue their own options – thus providing a potential means to avoid the grave consequences 
awaiting them in their country of origin.291 However, states are not obligated to delay expulsion 
where the refugee already possesses valid documentation for entry into another safe country 
where expulsion could be enforced.292  
Thus, while Article 32 provides states with a means to expel lawfully present refugees 
on the basis of national security, it was intended to limit the right of states to expel refugees 
both procedurally and substantively.293 Procedurally, an administrative agency may order 
expulsion; however it is required that the refugee have the right to appeal against such a 
decision to a more senior authority, which is better able to consider the full circumstances of 
the case, including the particular vulnerabilities of a refugee. Additionally, the due process 
requirement would necessitate the application of procedural fairness, reasonableness and the 
rule of law.294 The only rights that may be constrained due to compelling national security 
concerns are the right of the refugee to representation, and to submit evidence and to an appeal 
[own emphasis].  
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With regard to the substantive limitations, if a state were to seek expulsion on the basis 
of national security, it would need to show that the refugee’s actions or presence would, 
objectively and with a reasonable possibility, substantially threaten the national security 
interests of the host state.295 This is a high threshold and therefore, while national security 
concerns may permit a state to expel a refugee, and limit the refugee’s procedural rights, the 
state cannot expel a refugee on capricious or arbitrary national security concerns and certainly 
not without specific consideration for the refugee’s individual circumstances and connection 
to the threat.  
(e) Article 9 
Article 9 of the UN Convention concerns the provisional measures that a state may take with 
regard to asylum seekers in times of war or other exceptional circumstances. Specifically, 
Article 9 states: 
Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Contracting State, in time of war or other grave and 
exceptional circumstances, from taking provisionally measures which it considers to be 
essential to the national security in the case of a particular person, pending a determination by 
the Contracting State that the person is in fact a refugee and that the continuance of such 
measures is necessary in his case in the interests of national security.296 
 
This provision applies only in very limited and exceptional circumstances and it specifically 
concerns persons who have yet to be formally recognised as refugees. It also places a high 
threshold on states as to when they may take provisional measures, requiring that such 
measures be essential to national security [own emphasis]. Provisional measures may include 
the suspension of rights under the UN Convention, and may include detention while awaiting 
determination of refugee status.297 The limit on essential measures implies that the measures 
taken must be logically connected to averting the national security threat.298  
Hathaway argues that provisional measures may be taken against a subset or even all 
asylum seekers collectively in a state, but only under the most extreme national security 
concerns.299 However, this seems to be inconsistent with the wording of the provision, which 
requires that the measures pertain to a particular person – implying that a State cannot impose 
provisional measures in a general fashion on a group of asylum seekers, but should have 
consideration for the individual circumstances of each person. Nevertheless, such measures are 
limited in application as they must be provisional and not continued on an ongoing basis. 
Where an asylum seeker is determined to be a refugee, the provisional measures must cease to 
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be employed against them,300 and where an individual is subsequently considered a threat to 
national security, the provisions of Article 32 and 33 would apply.  
Therefore, Article 9 provides states with the means, in exceptional circumstances, to 
impose certain measures which can limit asylum seeker’s rights under the UN Convention 
pending a status determination. However, this provision does not provide states with the power 
to reject or return refugees on the basis of national security, and thus, it is not pertinent to this 
paper.  
 
II. Other National Security Exceptions 
As previously stated, there has been a trend in international law against exceptions to the 
principle of non-refoulement.301 In particular, the exception of ‘national security’ is not 
included in many other treaties or regional agreements. In particular, the Convention against 
Torture302 contains a clause reflecting the principle of non-refoulement in Article 3. However, 
Article 3 contains no exceptions.303 Nonetheless, the CAT only restricts refoulement in the 
limited circumstance of where the refugee would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 
Nevertheless, this provision acts as an additional safeguard to refugees of whom a state seeks 
to return under Article 33(2) for reasons of national security. Should that refugee, while falling 
within the national security exception of Article 33(2), be at risk of torture in their state of 
origin, a state bound by the CAT could not return that individual. Additionally, regional 
documents have also been found to further limit or completely remove exceptions when 
including the principle of non-refoulement.304 Neither the OAU Convention nor the Cartagena 
Declaration305 contain any exceptions to the principle.306 There are also no exceptions 
explicitly stated to non-refoulement in the American Convention on Human Rights,307 but this 
Convention does permit derogation under certain circumstances.308  
There are some regional agreements which do permit ‘national security’ exceptions; 
however, relatively narrow language is used. For example, the Declaration on Territorial 
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Asylum309 states that “exception may be made to the forgoing principle only for overriding 
reasons of national security or in order to safeguard the population, as in the case of a mass 
influx of persons,” and the Asian-African Refugee Principles allow for exceptions only “for 
overriding reasons of national security or safeguarding populations.”310 The threshold of 
‘overriding reasons’ is arguably quite low and could compare to a ‘balancing of interests’.311 
Thus, while the CAT and some of the other regional agreements would place further limitations 
on a state seeking to return or reject a refugee on the basis of national security, states which are 
not party to the UN Convention, but which are party to the Declaration on Territorial Asylum 
or the Asian-African Refugee Principles, would be subject to a lesser burden. 
Overall, this chapter has provided a detailed analysis of the provisions within the UN 
Convention that would allow a state to reject, return or expel a refugee on the basis of national 
security. It showed how the ground of national security tends to be limited in almost every 
provision in which it occurs. Additionally, this chapter discussed the emergence of the principle 
of non-refoulement as a jus cogens norm – and how this has affected and will affect the national 
security exceptions. It also considered the concept of non-entrée and how national security 
policies which act as a barrier to claims of asylum may violate the principle of non-refoulement, 
thus further curtailing the circumstances in which a state may employ such regulations. 
Additionally, this chapter examined provisions from other international documents and 
agreements which provide states with a means to reject or return refugees on the basis of 
national security, highlighting the trend towards an absolute or extremely limited principle of 
non-refoulement. The following chapter will consider the national security exceptions as 
interpreted and enforced by U.S. domestic law. 
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Chapter Four  
I. Interaction between U.S Law and International Law 
This paper is primarily focused on the national security exceptions to refugee status/admission 
as found in international refugee law. However, subsequently, this paper will consider 
President Trump’s refugee and immigration bans under international law. Thus, while the 
domestic refugee legislation of the U.S. is not pertinent to this analysis, it is nevertheless 
necessary in order to provide a background perspective into how the U.S. currently interprets 
and applies the UN Convention and other international instruments.  
In the Republic of South Africa, the Constitution312 obliges the judiciary to consider 
international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights.313 There is no such duty found in the 
U.S. Constitution.314 Nevertheless, Article VI of the U.S. Constitution states that: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; 
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.315 
 
Thus, treaties that have been signed and ratified by the U.S. form part of the supreme law of 
the land, and, where such treaties are self-executing, will create binding obligations on the 
President − in addition to prevailing over inconsistent state and federal law enacted prior to the 
treaty. Therefore, in some instances, the U.S. Supreme Court has occasionally accepted 
international law as a persuasive authority when determining the meaning of certain provisions 
in the U.S. Constitution.316  Additionally, a U.S. District Court in New York held that courts 
have a duty to interpret statutes in line with treaty obligations, as “an act of Congress ought 
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains . . .”317 However, a few years later, the same court acknowledged that “. . . Congress 
has the power to override international law if it so chooses, Restatement §402, cmt.I.”318  
Nevertheless, in more recent times it has been noted that when the U.S. does agree to 
sign an international treaty, specifically one concerning human rights, it often seeks to impose 
                                                      
312 Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
313 Rex D. Glensy ‘The Use of International Law in U.S. Constitutional Adjudication’ (2011) 25 Emory 
International Law Review 197 at 198. 
314 Constitution of the United States of America, 1789. Hereafter ‘U.S. Constitution’. 
315 Article IV of the U.S. Constitution.  
316 Glensy op cit note 313 at 198. 
317 Unites States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)). 
318 United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 52 
the condition that it will only accept its international obligations provided that its domestic 
Constitution remains supreme.319 This does not fall within the general consensus of what 
ratification substantively entails, which is to bring domestic law into alignment with 
international standards.320 Additionally, the U.S. continually refuses to endorse the 
enforceability of the conditional human rights obligations that it accepts – relying on its own 
notion that international rights are mostly not ‘self-executing’. Thus, U.S. courts are not readily 
able to implement such international rights.321 Finally, the U.S. also denies its own citizens the 
right to access the individual complaint mechanisms of the United Nations. This includes the 
mechanisms aimed at adjudicating issues regarding civil and political rights, as well as those 
of racial discrimination and freedom from torture.322 
The U.S. acceded to the Protocol323 in 1968, with only two minor reservations related 
to taxation and social security benefits. The U.S. did not attempt to impose any conditions 
concerning the Protocol’s compatibility with U.S. domestic law or their Constitution.324 The 
Refugees Act of 1980 was intended to incorporate the Protocol into U.S. domestic law, and 
this was confirmed in the case of INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, in which it was stated that: 
If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of ‘refugee’, and indeed 
the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress’s primary purposes was to bring U.S. refugee law 
into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees . . .325  
 
Nevertheless, it is only in rare situations that American decision makers display any awareness 
of how any of the other Protocol member-states have implemented the Convention and 
Protocol.326 For example, in the case of Matter of Acosta, the court stated that “[s]ince Congress 
intended the definition of a refugee in section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act to conform to the 
Protocol, it is appropriate for us to consider various international interpretations of that 
agreement. However, these interpretations are not binding upon us . . .”327 [own emphasis] 
Notably, the U.S. fails to concede the essential underlying theory of the UN Convention 
that persons who meet the UN Convention’s refugee definition are refugees and holders of 
rights, even when a state has yet to provide formal recognition of their status.328 Such persons 
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are entitled to the rights found in Articles 2-34 of the UN Convention, but they are not entitled 
to ‘asylum’ in any state party.329 In the U.S. Supreme Court’s initial decisions after accession 
to the Protocol,330 the court held that the only clear obligation that the U.S. owed was that of 
non-refoulement. Additionally, while the U.S. recognised in the Cardoza-Fonseca case that 
the standard of proof regarding the ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ element in an asylum 
case is 10%, it has held that a refugee or asylum seeker must show that there is a probability 
of persecution on return in order to be granted ‘withholding of removal’ (non-refoulement) 
under INA §241(b)(3) [own emphasis].331  
 
II. The Functioning of U.S. Refugee Law 
As previously stated, the definition of ‘refugee’ under U.S. domestic law can be found in 
§101(a)(42) of the INA.332 The U.S., however, largely follows a different procedure when it 
comes to accepting refugees. In fact, its approach is the opposite of what is required under the 
international refugee regime.333 Under U.S. law, the focus of the refugee system is on the 
recognition and resettlement of persons overseas who have applied for refugee status. This 
process is governed by §207 of the INA.334 The UN Convention and Protocol do not require 
that states recognise and provide rights to refugees who are outside of their territory; however, 
it does require that states acknowledge those who are within or at their borders. Thus, someone 
who meets the UN Convention’s definition of a refugee is entitled to the Convention’s rights 
at the border of a host state before that state has formally recognised them as a refugee.335 For 
example, the state cannot refoule a refugee from their border unless it can be determined that 
such a person is not a refugee or that they are subject to one of the exceptions to Article 33(2).  
The United States’ Office of Refugee Resettlement is overseen by the Department of 
Health and Human Services. Under the resettlement programme, a limited number of 
individuals are selected from refugee camps around the world for admission. This is often done 
in consultation with and on the recommendation of the UNHCR.336 Thus, while such persons 
have already been recognised as refugees by the UNHCR, the U.S. will still perform its own 
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assessment of the individual’s status as a refugee before recognising them as a refugee. This 
process involves an intricate security check and multiple interviews.337 The procedure and 
elements can be found in §208 of the INA.  
The applicant needs to show a well-founded fear of persecution on account of one of 
the listed grounds.338 This is assessed on an objective and subjective basis. Persecution is not 
defined in the INA or in other regulations; however, it can be determined through an 
examination of the case law and interpretations as put forward by the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).339 Refugees must also be able to show 
that they are unwilling or unable to return to their country of origin. Additionally, the U.S. 
takes into consideration past persecution and the severity of past harm.340 Thus, the U.S. 
expands the definition of a refugee to include those who have suffered persecution in the past, 
even where there has been a change in conditions and no future persecution is feared. However, 
there are additional barriers to relief when a claim is based solely on past persecution.341  
(a) U.S. Refugee Procedure and the National Security Exceptions 
The security and interview process can take up to 24 months before the applicant arrives in the 
U.S.342 Further along in the process, the refugees will have to interact with the United States 
Citizenship Immigration Services (USCIS), which is a unit within the DHS. A refugee status 
determination assessment and interview will be performed by officers of USCIS.343 Once a 
refugee has met the required elements, they will also need to show that they are not subject to 
any of the bars to admission, which include conduct similar to that found in Article 1F of the 
UN Convention. Specifically, §208(b)(2)(A) of the INA states: 
(2) Exceptions. - 
(A) In general. - Paragraph (1) shall not apply to an alien if the Attorney General 
determines that -  
(i) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the 
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; 
(ii) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly 
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United 
States;  
(iii) there are serious reasons for believing that the alien has committed a 
serious non-political crime outside the United States prior to the arrival 
of the alien in the United States;  
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(iv) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to the 
security of the United States;  
(v) the alien is described in subclause (I), (II), (III), (IV), or (VI) of section 
212(a)(3)(B)(i) or section 237(a)(4)(B) (relating to terrorist activity), 
unless, in the case only of an alien described in subclause (IV) of 
section 212(a)(3)(B)(i), the Attorney General determines, in the 
Attorney General's discretion, that there are not reasonable grounds for 
regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the United States; or  
(vi)  the alien was firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the 
United States.344 
 
Therefore, U.S. domestic legislation has incorporated the Article 1F exclusions. 
Section 208(b)(2)(A)(iii) is almost exactly similar to that of Article 1F(b), and §208(b)(2)(A)(i) 
could be argued to be in alignment with Article 1F(a) and (c). However, the U.S. has 
incorporated the Article 33(2) exceptions (to non-refoulement) in the UN Convention into their 
exceptions to asylum clause. In particular, the INA states that a particularly serious crime, as 
mentioned in §208(b)(2)(A)(ii), would be that of an ‘aggravated felony’.345 Thus, refugees 
applying from overseas face an incredibly high legal standard in order to gain recognition of 
their status and to subsequently be admitted into the U.S. However, there is also another way 
in which an individual may seek refugee status in the U.S. 
Accommodating the traditional practices of international refugee law, U.S. law 
provides that an individual may apply for protection (‘asylum status’) where they meet the 
domestic definition of a refugee, when they are already in the U.S. or when they are seeking 
admission at the border.346 These applications can either be affirmative or defensive. An 
affirmative application is when a refugee applies for asylum at a USCIS Asylum Office or on 
arrival at a U.S. border.347 A defensive application is when a refugee, who is already within the 
U.S., applies for asylum as a defence during removal proceedings. Additionally, the U.S. has 
created separate forms of relief in defensive applications: an application for asylum or an 
application for withholding of removal.348 Defensive applications for asylum or withholding 
of removal are filed with the immigration judge.349 
In an application for asylum, the individual would need to show that he/she meets the 
definition of a refugee under the INA and that he/she is not subject to any of the bars. Where 
an application for asylum is denied, the court will automatically consider an application for 
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withholding of removal as an alternative.350 Withholding of removal also has a higher burden, 
as the individual needs to show a probability (>50%) that they will face harm/persecution on 
return. There is also a bar on this form of relief if the person has been convicted of a particularly 
serious crime with a five-year sentence (regardless of the time actually served). Regrettably, 
the U.S. provides greater rights to those who are awarded asylum to those granted withholding 
of removal. Consequently, those granted asylum may later adjust their status to that of a 
permanent resident, and eventually gain citizenship, withholding of removal provides no such 
option.351  
(b) The Principle of Non-Refoulement under U.S. Immigration and Refugee Law 
The principle of non-refoulement under Article 33 of the UN Convention applies to all refugees 
who meet the UN Convention definition. The U.S., however, applies it to those it has rejected 
for asylum, after finding that they do not meet the U.S. domestic definition of a refugee. 
Therefore, the U.S. utilises the principle to protect those individuals who are barred from 
asylum, but fall within the small window of those barred from asylum but still eligible for 
withholding of removal. This includes those who did not apply for asylum within one year of 
arrival in the U.S., as required by §208(a)(2)(B) of the INA, or who had failed in a previous 
application for asylum,352 but would still be subject to persecution on return. Additionally, 
applications for asylum in the U.S. are discretionary;353 thus, even where an individual meets 
the definition and does not fall within any of the exceptions, he/she may still be denied 
asylum.354 In contrast, withholding of removal is mandatory where the requirements are met.355  
That the U.S. holds an aggravated felony to automatically constitute a particularly 
serious crime is problematic, especially when considering the expansion of the definition of an 
aggravated felony.356 For example, a crime such as ‘petty larceny’ could constitute an 
aggravated felony if the sentence is at least one year.357 This seems to be out of touch with the 
UNHCR Handbook, which requires that the word ‘crime’ in Article 1F(b) should only denote 
a capital crime or ‘a very grave punishable act’.358 Additionally, the UNHCR Handbook 
requires that the ‘nature of the offence’ be balanced against the ‘degree of persecution feared’ 
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when determining whether the crime precludes asylum.359 However, the U.S. Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) has explicitly rejected this approach under both the ‘serious non-
political crime’ and ‘particularly serious crime’ exceptions. Instead, the BIA has held that the 
nature of the crime is the determining factor when assessing the level of seriousness.360 This 
was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, which found that the recommendations in the 
UNHCR Handbook were ‘useful’ but not ‘binding’.361 
(c) U.S. Immigration and Refugee Law and the Convention against Torture 
In 1990, the U.S. Senate ratified the CAT, along with an extensive list of reservations, 
understandings and declarations.362 Additionally, the CAT was declared to be not self-
executing and consequently, the U.S. falls short on many of its obligations under the treaty.363 
Notably, the U.S. held that Article 3 of the CAT (regarding non-refoulement) required that a 
person can only not be returned where “it is more likely than not that he will be tortured.”364 
Thus, the U.S. increased the standard of proof required in order to obtain relief under the non-
refoulement provision of the CAT.  
Furthermore, the U.S. also placed exceptions on ‘withholding of removal’ under the 
CAT, excluding those who had been convicted of a particularly serious crime, who had 
committed acts of persecution, or who are a threat to national security.365 Thus, the U.S. 
excludes people from protection under this section, whereas the CAT held this rule as 
absolute.366 In order to bring the domestic legislation in line with their international obligations 
under the CAT, the Justice Department issued interim regulations that created a distinction 
between ‘withholding of removal’ and ‘deferral of removal’, which is a more limited remedy. 
There is no criminal bar to accessing the remedy of ‘deferral of removal’; however, when the 
danger of torture subsides, it is significantly easier to refoule a person granted ‘deferral’ than 
one who was granted ‘withholding’.367  
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(d) U.S. Policies of Non-Entrée  
Finally, the U.S. has also engaged in non-entrée strategies.368 Notably, the requirement that an 
application for asylum be filed within one year of arrival in the U.S.369 is particularly limiting 
– despite the presence of a few exceptions.370 There is no strict deadline in the UN Convention, 
and to impose one on asylum seekers who are often disorientated, traumatised and without 
significant resources is an incredible burden that has resulted in almost a third of applicants 
being excluded.371  
The Expedited Removal procedures, established in 1996, are aimed at deterring 
fraudulent entries, reducing asylum applications, and to work speedily and cheaply through 
asylum applications.372 These procedures have been found to be increasingly problematic, with 
the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom reporting that “one-sixth of migrants 
whom it observed at U.S. ports of entry who expressed a fear of return were (illegally) denied 
the opportunity to apply for political asylum.”373 The Bush Administration also employed the 
Coast Guard to interdict and return Haitians travelling to the U.S. via boat – including asylum-
seekers – citing national security concerns.374 While a refugee may be returned on account of 
being a threat of national security, such a consideration needs to be weighed up in a formal 
procedure on an individual scale. It has also been held by counter-terror experts that the Haitian 
boat travellers were not viewed as a terrorist threat.375  
Other non-entrée tactics include the detention of asylum-seekers, criminal persecutions 
for illegal entry (in violation of Article 31 of the UN Convention), denying employment 
authorisation, application fees, visa and carrier sanctions and the reinstatement of removal 
orders.376 Therefore, in combination with the other inconsistencies with its obligations under 
international law, it is clear that the U.S. has inadequately implemented its obligations under 
international refugee law into their domestic legislation. There is a pattern of consistent 
avoidance of its international commitments and duties in addition to a failure to take account 
of international and foreign law when interpreting its implementing legislation. One may be 
tempted to accredit this to the fact that the U.S. is not party to the Vienna Convention;377 
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however, U.S. courts have recognised the Convention as authoritative.378 In conclusion, the 
U.S. has shown a preponderance to disregard international law and its commitments therein – 
a trend that has been furthered by President Trump’s immigration executive orders.  
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Chapter Five 
I. The Executive Orders, the Proclamation and U.S. Case Law 
At the time of writing this paper, the refugee ban contained in the second executive order has 
expired.379 However, it is nevertheless still relevant to consider its legality under international 
law from an academic perspective. Additionally, President Trump has issued a proclamation 
which imposes immigration bans indefinitely on many Muslim-majority countries.380 While 
this paper is focused on refugee law, immigration is necessarily connected as many refugees 
will not reveal their wish to apply for asylum until they have reached their chosen country of 
refuge. Other asylum seekers may seek to flee persecution in their country of origin and, 
without an understanding of international refugee law, may seek immigration instead of 
asylum. Thus, a blanket immigration ban may deny and also deter legitimate refugees from 
seeking asylum contrary to the principles of international refugee law. In this paper, the most 
important acts of President Trump are those of EO1, EO2 and the Proclamation. The content 
of these acts changed in response to the various court opinions that emerged for and against 
the bans. Thus, before analysing the international legality of the orders, it is necessary to 
examine their content.  
(a) The First ‘Travel-Ban’ Executive Order 
The first ‘travel-ban’ executive order was issued on 27 January 2017, and it contained several 
notable policy and procedural changes.381 First, section 3(c) banned the entry of individuals 
from seven countries: Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Secondly, section 
5(a) suspended the United States Refugee Admissions Program for a period of 120 days.382 
Additionally, section 5(b) required the Secretary of State to prioritise claims made by refugees 
whose religion was a minority religion in their country of origin. Thirdly, section 5(c) sought 
to indefinitely suspend the entry of all Syrian refugees.383 The first EO also included exceptions 
made in sections 3(g) and 5(e), which could be made on a case-by-case basis by the Secretary 
of State.  
In the case of Washington v. Trump, the court considered the legality and 
constitutionality of the challenged sections in EO1. This case was brought by the Government 
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of the United States seeking a stay of the temporary restraining order (TRO) imposed by the 
Washington District Court against EO1. First, the court in this case found that EO1 violated 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which applies to ‘all persons’ within the U.S. 
regardless of the lawfulness of their presence.384 In particular, the court held the due process 
rights of lawful permanent residents and of refugees were violated.385 Secondly, the court 
considered whether EO1 was unlawful due to issues regarding religious discrimination, but it 
reserved judgment until a later date.386 Thus, in order to prevent irreparable harm by allowing 
the reinstatement of EO1, the court denied the motion for a stay of the TRO pending appeal.387  
(b) The Second ‘Travel-Ban’ Executive Order 
The second executive order was issued on 6 March 2017, and revoked EO1 on taking effect.388 
Thus, the appeal against the TRO on EO1 was dismissed. Similar to EO1, section 2 of EO2 
sought to suspend the entry of nationals from six countries for a period of 90 days. These 
countries are: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Thus, EO2, unlike EO1, does not 
suspend the entry of Iraqi nationals as a result of the ‘close cooperative relationship’ between 
the U.S. and the Iraqi governments.389  
Additionally, unlike EO1, EO2 specifically excludes from the ban lawful permanent 
residents; admitted or paroled foreign nationals; individuals with valid travel documents 
permitting entrance into the U.S., other than a visa; dual nationals travelling on a passport other 
than the one from the listed country; foreign-nationals travelling on a diplomatic or other 
specified visa; as well as those who have been granted asylum or refugees who have already 
been admitted into the U.S. or have been granted withholding of removal, advance parole, or 
protection under CAT.390 There is also a case-by-case exception for those who were previously 
admitted for a long-term activity; those with significant contacts within the U.S.; those with 
significant business or professional obligations in the U.S; those with close family members 
who are lawfully within in the U.S.; for the entry of young children and infants; those employed 
by the U.S. government; for travel related to a designated international organisation as well as 
a few other exceptions.391  
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Section 6 of the second executive order, like that of EO1, contained a provision 
suspending the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days.392 This ban on the entry of 
refugees also includes those who were formally scheduled to transit to the U.S. prior to the 
effective date of the EO. The second EO also provided for waivers on a case-by-case basis to 
admit refugees where their admission would provide a means for the U.S. to abide by its pre-
existing international agreements or where the denial of admission would cause undue 
hardship.393 Additionally, unlike EO1, EO2 no longer contains any reference to exceptions for 
‘religious minorities’ nor does it contain the indefinite ban on Syrian refugees.394  
In the case of Hawaii v. Trump (March) the court granted the motion for a TRO against 
EO2. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim 
under the Establishment Clause.395 The Establishment Clause provides that one religion cannot 
be officially preferred over any other religious denomination.396 The court analysed EO2 
according to the test found in the Lemon v. Kurtzman case,397 in which a government act should 
first, have a primary secular purpose; secondly, should not have a principal effect of inhibiting 
or advancing religion; and thirdly, should not promote any entanglement with religion.398  
The court rejected the government’s argument that by only targeting six Muslim 
majority countries it was only targeting a fraction of the global Muslim population, so that the 
EO was therefore religiously neutral. Notably, the court held that “the notion that one can 
demonstrate animus toward any group of people only by targeting all of them at once is 
fundamentally flawed.”399 The court also took into account circumstantial evidence, such as 
statements made by the President in reference to EO2. Additionally, the court found the pretext 
for the EO, national security, to be unsupported by evidence, commenting that nationality was 
a poor criterion for determining whether an individual was a threat to national security.400  
In the appeal of the Hawaii v. Trump case to the 9th Circuit, the court shifted focus away 
from the content of EO2, and focused more on whether the President acted outside the authority 
delegated to him by Congress.401 In this case, the court held that President Trump did not meet 
the precondition for the exercise of his authority in suspending the refugee programme and in 
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the reduction of the cap on the admission of refugees into the U.S.402 This precondition required 
him to make a sufficient finding that the entry of refugees would be ‘detrimental to the interests 
of the United States’ [court’s emphasis].403 The court also held that EO2 violated the INA as it 
required the President to follow certain procedures when setting the annual cap on refugees 
and, additionally, it prohibited nationality-based discrimination.404 Notably, the court stated 
that: “National security is not a ‘talismanic incantation’ that, once invoked, can support any 
and all exercise of executive power under §1182(f).”405 
 
Nevertheless, in June 2017, the Supreme Court, while agreeing to consider the case in full in 
October 2017, ruled that the immigration bans and the suspension of the refugee programme 
could go into effect. It also provided that the ban and suspension of the refugee programme 
would not apply to those who were able to prove a ‘bona fide’ relationship with a person or 
entity in the U.S.406 After the expiry of the suspension on immigration on 24 September 2017, 
the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against the ban, as the case was no longer ‘live’. 
However, the suspension of the refugee programme remained in place until 24 October 2017. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court accepted the adjustment of the refugee cap to 45’000 – the 
lowest in modern U.S. history.407  
(c) Proclamation 9645 
President Trump issued Proclamation 9645 on 24 September 2017. The Proclamation, unlike 
EO1 and EO2, indefinitely suspends the immigration of nationals from seven listed countries408 
and also imposes restrictions on the entry of certain Venezuelan government officials [own 
emphasis].409 The Proclamation follows from a directive contained in EO2, which required the 
Secretary of Homeland Security to perform a global review of the cooperativeness of countries, 
with regard to information sharing, where their nationals are seeking entry into the U.S.410 The 
same exceptions that applied in EO2 with regard to permanent residents, and others, as 
mentioned previously, were also included in the Proclamation.411 Finally, the Proclamation 
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makes no mention of the Refugee Admissions Program as, at that time, the suspension on the 
program was still in place.  
On 17 October 2017, the day before the Proclamation was set to take effect, the District 
Court in Hawaii granted a TRO blocking the ban on the six Muslim-majority countries listed 
in the Proclamation.412 However, on 24 October 2017, the Supreme Court of the United States 
vacated the court decision in the Hawaii v. Trump (June) case as moot, while expressing no 
view on the merits.413 On 4 December 2017, the Supreme Court granted the request that the 
preliminary injunction (converted from the TRO) be stayed pending review of the injunction.414  
Subsequently, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals considered the legality of the 
immigration bans included in the Proclamation.415 In this case, the court held that the 
Proclamation fell foul of the same deficiencies as that of EO2. Thus, the court found that the 
President exceeded the authority provided to him under the INA, in particular with regard to 
the indefinite nature of the ban416 and concerning the way in which the Proclamation supplanted 
Congress’s statutory scheme without its consent.417 Again, the court held that the President 
failed to meet the preconditions contained in §1182(f). However, while the court ultimately 
held that the preliminary injunction might continue – it narrowed the scope to apply only to 
those with a credible ‘bona fide’ relationship with a U.S. person or entity. Additionally, the 
court stayed the application of its own order pending review in the Supreme Court. Thus, the 
immigration bans contained in the Proclamation remain in effect until they are heard before the 
Supreme Court.418  
(d) New ‘Enhanced Vetting’ Procedures 
As previously mentioned, the immigration bans are relevant to refugees because potential 
refugees may be seeking admission into the U.S. via means other than the Refugee Admissions 
Program. Nevertheless, while the Proclamation makes no reference to the suspension of the 
refugee program, the DHS followed the instructions contained in section 6(a) of EO2 and 
developed additional procedures for the refugee screening and vetting process.419 These 
procedures mainly focus on the refugee resettlement application process, the interviews and 
adjudication process and system checks. More specifically, the new procedures require more 
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in-depth biographical data420 from refugees in addition to increased training and improved 
processes aimed at detecting fraud.421 The memorandum also announced that the citizens of 11 
unnamed countries would be admitted only on a case-by-case basis pending a subsequent 90-
day period in which the government intended to conduct an additional round of reviews.422 
Finally, the memo also states that the ‘follow-to-join’ programme, for close relatives of 
refugees already admitted to the U.S., will be paused indefinitely until the administration has 
conducted a further review.423  
These ‘enhanced’ vetting measures, and particularly the focus on detecting fraud, may 
bring the U.S. in violation of their obligations under the UN Convention. Specifically, Article 
31 of the UN Convention provides that member states should not impose any penalties on 
asylum seekers who entered or are unlawfully present in the host country.424 Thus, where a 
refugee has entered the U.S. by means of fraud or fraudulent documents with the intention of 
applying for asylum this article would require the U.S. to refrain from convicting the asylum 
seeker.425 Additionally, there is no mention of bad faith in the UN Convention; there are only 
those limitations as included in Article 33(2) and Article 1F, as discussed in Chapter three. 
States are also not permitted to make reservations which equate bad-faith claims to the 
exclusion clauses, as the exclusion clauses are restricted to individuals who have committed 
serious crimes.426  
In addition, these sections may result in a violation of the non-refoulement principle 
via means of non-entrée, as they all but prevent nationals of 11 countries from succeeding in 
an application for asylum. The memorandum also provided that asylum applicants from other 
countries would be prioritised.427 Thus, the new rules and procedures severely discourage and 
limit refugees’ ability to seek asylum in the U.S. In the subsequent section, this paper will 
consider whether the ‘travel-ban’ executive orders and the Proclamation are in conflict with 
the United States’ obligations under the UN Convention and Protocol.  
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II. International Law 
(a) Article 9 
Article 9 allows member states to take provisional measures against asylum-seekers that are 
essential to national security in times of war, or other grave and exceptional circumstance. 
While the U.S. may assert that they are engaged in a ‘war on terror’, such a war is not 
formalised, but ideological. Terrorism, too, is essentially a tactic – not an entity with which 
one could traditionally be at war. Nevertheless, the ‘war on terror’ has been recognised 
internationally – and thus it is possible that the U.S. could claim that EO1, EO2 and the 
Proclamation are provisional measures that fall within Article 9. However, this section 
explicitly states that such measures may be taken and continued in the case of ‘a particular 
person’. Thus, such measures should be taken on a case-by-case basis. The first executive 
order, EO2 and the Proclamation all include measures that apply to all nationals from numerous 
countries, and at times, suspending the admission of all refugees into the country. 
Additionally, drawing from the domestic case of Hawaii v. Trump (Dec), Article 9 only 
permits states to take measures provisionally i.e. a measure that is temporary or subject to 
change.428 The Proclamation bans immigration from seven listed countries indefinitely. Thus, 
while it is possible that the U.S. may claim to be acting in a time of war or other grave and 
exceptional circumstance, the measures taken are neither with regard to an individual person 
nor are they provisional. Therefore, none of the ‘travel-ban’ orders nor the Proclamation can 
be justified under Article 9 of the UN Convention.    
(b) Article 1F 
Article 1F of the UN Convention provides for the exclusion clauses, which aim to avoid 
granting refugee status to those who are considered to be undeserving. Following the 
explanation of Article 1F previously in Chapter three, one is able to understand how terrorist 
acts may fall within the ambit of the exclusion clauses. How terrorism relates to the UN 
Convention is important in this section, as EO1, EO2 and the Proclamation explicitly state that 
their purpose aimed at protecting the public safety of U.S. citizens from terrorist activities.429 
Thus, the justification provided for the orders and policies advocated in EO1, EO2 and the 
Proclamation is arguably the national security of the U.S. In particular, the object is to protect 
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the nation from acts of terrorism by restricting the entry of individuals who intend to commit 
such acts. As stated previously, national security is not specifically mentioned in Article 1F, 
and thus to exclude refugees solely on the basis of ‘national security’ would run against the 
object and purpose of Article 1F as well as the conceptual framework of the UN Convention.430 
Article 1F is not an anti-terrorism provision; however it can be used to exclude terrorist 
actors. Thus, initially it may seem that the executive orders and Proclamation may be justifiable 
under Article 1F. However, there are limitations. First, it requires that there be ‘serious reasons’ 
for holding that someone falls within one of the exclusion clauses. This burden, as stated 
previously, is somewhere between a ‘balance of probabilities’ and ‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt’.431 In this case, while there has been a review by the Department of State and the 
Department of Homeland Security,432 this review was found to be insufficient by the court in 
the Hawaii v Trump (Dec) case to warrant a blanket ban on the entry of individuals from certain 
nations.433 Thus, it is likely that the reasons provided for the ban would not meet the required 
burden of proof under Article 1F.  
Secondly, Article 1F requires that persons be excluded only where they have either 
‘committed’ one of the acts listed in subsection (a) or (b), or have been found guilty with regard 
to subsection (c). The EOs and the Proclamation, however, contain no such requirements and 
ban all nationals of certain countries on the basis of findings that these countries present 
‘heightened concerns about terrorism’434 or that they do not have adequate identity-
management and information-sharing capabilities.435 Additionally, subsection (c) is only 
relevant to high-ranking persons, and thus could not be used as part of a broad nationality-
based ban. Thirdly, the U.S. already has strict inadmissibility bars for applicants for 
immigration and asylum seekers who have materially supported designated foreign terrorist 
organisations.436 The overbroad ambit of the term ‘material support’ in the INA arguably 
already puts the U.S. at risk of violating its obligations under the UN Convention and 
Protocol.437 In particular, the U.S. places a large focus on the label of ‘terrorist’ rather than on 
the acts themselves.438  The EOs and the Proclamation therefore take U.S. refugee policy way 
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beyond the scope of the exclusion clauses – denying refugees the ability to even seek asylum 
in the U.S. even if they have no connection at all to terrorism.  
Finally, Article 1F requires that those excluded be considered on an individualised 
basis. This can be determined from the language of the section, which refers to ‘any person’, 
in addition to recommendations by the UNHCR.439 Regarding the EOs and the Proclamation, 
these only contain provisions for determining whether nationals from the excluded states may 
be admitted on a case-by-case basis – the inverse of what is required in the UN Convention 
[own emphasis]. Ultimately, as both of the EOs and the Proclamation prevent potential refugees 
and all nationals from certain countries from seeking asylum, they cannot be justified under 
Article 1F of the UN Convention.  
(c) Article 33(2) 
Article 33(1) of the UN Convention provides for the principle of non-refoulement, and 
Article33(2) contains the only exceptions thereto. This section prevents a state from returning 
a refugee to a territory in which his/her life or freedom would be threatened on account of one 
of the listed grounds. However, this protection does not apply to a person of whom there are 
reasonable grounds for considering that they are a danger to the security of the country, have 
been convicted of a particularly serious crime or who constitutes a danger to the community of 
the country of refuge.440 This provision would specifically apply in the case of refugees who 
travelled to the U.S. with the intent of making an affirmative asylum application on arrival.  
While travelling to the U.S. without already having been granted asylum or some sort 
of immigration visa would be exceptionally difficult, but not impossible. Such persons would, 
under EO1, EO2 and the Proclamation, be denied asylum as a consequence of their nationality, 
unless they could meet the high burden required to be admitted on a case-by-case basis. In such 
instance, the U.S. would be in violation of its obligations under the UN Convention if the 
asylum seeker was refouled. Nevertheless, Article 33(2) does provide for some exceptions.  
While the executive orders and the Proclamation claim to be acting for the security of 
the country and to protect the community of the U.S., the Article 33(2) exception requires that 
there be ‘reasonable grounds’ for finding that the individual applicant is such a threat. In this 
case, and as stated previously in this chapter, the executive orders and the proclamation have 
been found by U.S. domestic courts to not be based on sufficient evidence stating that, ‘the 
Proclamation – like EO-2 – fails to ‘provide a rationale explaining why permitting entry of 
                                                      
439 UNHCR op cit note 181 at 19. 
440 Article 33(2) op cit note 15. 
 69 
nationals from the six designated countries under current protocols would be detrimental to the 
interest of the United States’.441 Additionally, the immigration ban and new refugee restrictions 
apply in a blanket manner on the basis of nationality, whereas Article 33(2) only permits the 
exclusion of a refugee on a case-by-case basis.  
Thus, it is unlikely that the reasonable grounds standard in Article 33(2) would be met 
by the EOs or by the Proclamation. Therefore, the Article 33(2) exceptions cannot be used to 
justify the orders or the Proclamation, and as such, should any refugees have been refouled 
under these orders, the U.S. would be in violation of its obligations under the UN Convention 
and Protocol.  
(i) Non-entrée 
As the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program mainly takes applications from refugees who have 
been recognised by the UNHCR and considers such applications while the refugee remains in 
another country, the issue of non-refoulement is more complicated. Such persons, if rejected, 
are not strictly ‘returned’ to a territory in which their life or freedom is threatened; they are 
simply denied asylum in the U.S. These applications may be made from a ‘safe’ third country, 
the applicant’s country of origin or another country in which the applicant may be at risk of 
persecution. For example, a gay man may flee persecution in Iran for Turkey, and apply for 
refugee status in the U.S. from Turkey. However, that same man may still face persecution on 
the basis of his sexuality in Turkey, and thus it is possible that, in this case, Turkey may not be 
considered a ‘safe’ third country.442  
The Executive Orders and the Proclamation could arguably be considered to be non-
entrée strategies, as, in effect, they prevent asylum seekers from being able to access asylum 
and the refugee status processes. While the U.S. is not required to accept all refugees seeking 
admission, non-entrée strategies are also not illegal, Article 33(2) cannot be used to implement 
policies which would divert asylum seekers abroad under the guise of a blanket declaration 
that they are a security risk.443  Using Article 33(2) in this way could have the potential of 
indirectly violating the principle of non-refoulement, which, as a jus cogens norm, would result 
in the U.S. committing an act against the international public order. 
(d) Article 3 
Article 3 of the UN Convention is a non-discrimination clause. It states that: 
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The Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees without 
discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin. 
 
The first executive order explicitly provided preference to refugees from religious minorities – 
a clear instance of discrimination against the majority religions of the listed countries. 
Additionally, EO1 sought to suspend the admission of refugees from Syria indefinitely, which 
is a clear act of discrimination on the basis of country of origin. Therefore, EO1 was in clear 
violation of Article 3 of the UN Convention and Protocol.  
Whilst EO2 does not contain a provision that provides preference to refugees who are 
members of a religious minority, it does still limit immigration on the basis of nationality. As 
previously stated, such a limitation could have a severe impact on asylum seekers. 
Additionally, both EO2 and the Proclamation contained statements which provided that, 
“[n]othing in this order [proclamation] shall be construed to limit the ability of an individual 
to seek asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture, 
consistent with the laws of the United States.” However, the court in Hawaii v Trump (June) 
considered a similar argument by the U.S. Government and held that it would be unsustainable 
for the President to circumvent the non-discrimination provisions of the INA by granting visas 
to nationals of the six listed countries, but then denying them entry.444  
Following the same reasoning, the U.S. government cannot argue that individuals are 
open to seek asylum when it has also stated that the Refugee Admissions Program has been 
suspended and that persons of certain nationalities may not be admitted for immigration. 
Additionally, the new rules and restrictions in the refugee process – in particular against the 11 
unnamed countries – effectively close off the asylum-seeking process. This paper does not 
intend to suggest that the U.S. must automatically grant entry to all refugees or immigrants; 
however, it notes that refugee applicants cannot be subjected to discrimination on the basis of 
race, religion or country of origin throughout the refugee process – be it at the time of 
application or on arrival at a port of entry.445 Thus, the EO2 and the Proclamation are in 
violation of Article 3 of the UN Convention and Protocol.  
(e) Convention against Torture 
As there are no exceptions to Article 3 of the CAT, the U.S. would be in violation of its 
obligations under the CAT should it have returned any person to a territory in which they were 
likely to be subject to torture. As the immigration bans and refugee suspension did not provide 
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for the return of those who had already been granted withholding of removal or deferral of 
removal under the CAT, it is unlikely that the U.S. violated the CAT by means of the EOs or 
the Proclamation. However, while the non-entrée principle has yet to be applied in the instance 
of the CAT, it should be noted that it is possible that the orders and proclamation may have 
indirectly resulted in individuals being unable to seek refuge from torture.  
 
Overall, this chapter has examined the contents of the recent U.S. policies concerning the 
‘Travel-ban’ and refugee suspension. Additionally, it has considered the U.S. court cases in 
response to the EOs and the Proclamation and determined how the EOs and Proclamation 
conflicted with domestic U.S. law. Finally, this chapter analysed the EOs and the Proclamation 
under international refugee law, finding that none of the national security exceptions provide a 
justification, nor would they permit, such policies. Thus, in the next chapter, this paper will 
form its conclusion, taking note of the implications of this paper, in addition to its limitations, 




This paper aimed to examine when, under the UN Convention and Protocol, a state may refuse 
to grant asylum to a refugee under the auspices of ‘national security’. This includes instances 
where refugees are stopped at the border of a state, where recognised refugee status is revoked 
and finally, where legislation and policies are implemented to prevent refugees from even 
attempting to apply for asylum. Overall, this paper sought to answer the question as to whether 
the ‘travel ban’ executive orders and the Proclamation were in violation of the United States’ 
obligations under international law, and specifically under the UN Convention and Protocol.  
Refugee and immigration legislation has been increasingly linked to issues of national 
security. Prior to the attacks of 9/11, academic writing generally focused on the extent of states’ 
obligations to refugees under international law and the recognition of refugee rights. Post-9/11, 
there was an increase in academic writing examining the connection between national security, 
immigration and refugees. However, despite the existence of restrictions on the admission of 
refugees in the west, there appeared to be a more liberal progression in immigration and refugee 
policies towards a more humanitarian and open approach. In response to the recent rise in anti-
refugee and anti-immigration sentiment,446 this paper has focused on the overlap between 
national security and international refugee law, and the recent restrictive U.S. immigration and 
refugee policies. 
Initially, this paper explored the international refugee regime, including that found in 
regional agreements, and how international refugee law has been incorporated into U.S. 
domestic legislation. With particular regard to the UN Convention, this paper detailed the 
exceptional provisions found in Article 9, Article 1F, Article 32 and Article 33, which provide 
‘contracting states’ with the means to reject or exclude asylum seekers. It also examined how 
these provisions have been applied in other agreements – such as the CAT. Overall, under 
international law, it is necessary that refugees be rejected only in the most extreme 
circumstances and thus, all the exception clauses are to be interpreted restrictively and applied 
on an individualised basis.  
Subsequently, this paper has provided an overview of domestic U.S. refugee law and 
its interaction with international law. It has shown that the refugee law regime in the U.S. is 
more restrictive than that found under international law. Further, this paper has examined the 
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‘travel-ban’ executive orders and the U.S. cases that followed in Washington, Hawaii and in 
the Supreme Court. These cases highlighted the differing perspectives on the legality of the 
EOs under U.S. law with consideration to both constitutional and statutory issues. While some 
of the cases found it necessary to consider the discriminatory nature of the EOs, others focused 
only on whether the President had the authority to enact the immigration and refugee 
suspensions.  
This paper also highlighted the issuing of the Proclamation which sought to continue 
the immigration bans found in the EOs, and subsequently discussed the court cases that had 
been brought against the Proclamation. It noted that while the Proclamation makes no mention 
of the suspension of the Refugee Admissions Programme, the suspension of nationals of certain 
countries will more than likely result in the exclusion of refugees and asylum-seekers. Thus, 
this paper also examined the U.S. case law triggered by the Proclamation, finding that the 
Proclamation fell foul of the same U.S. statutory and constitutional issues as the EOs that came 
before it. Nevertheless, the provisions of the Proclamation have been allowed to continue 
pending review by the Supreme Court, thus, the findings of this paper remain current. 
Finally, this paper performed an assessment of the EOs and the Proclamation under 
international refugee law. It has held that the EOs and the Proclamation violate international 
refugee law and cannot be justified under any of the ‘national security’ exceptions. The EOs 
and the Proclamation are overbroad and all-encompassing; they do not follow international 
law, which requires refugee exclusions to be exceptional. While international law does provide 
states with the means to act out of necessity in the interests of national security with regard to 
refugees, this must be done on a case-by-case basis with an examination of individualised 
circumstances. Nationality-based bans do not conform to the tenets of international law, in 
particular they contravene the non-discrimination provision found in Article 3 of the UN 
Convention and Protocol. In conclusion, therefore, this paper holds that the ‘travel-ban’ 
executive orders and the Proclamation put the U.S. in violation of its obligations under 
international law.  
The research conducted, and the subsequent findings of this paper are limited as the 
issues surveyed are currently developing. Therefore, there is very little academic literature and 
analysis on the EOs and the Proclamation. Indeed, even the literature and source material which 
does consider the legality of the EOs, only examines the orders from an American law 
perspective. Additionally, the application of this paper’s findings is also limited, as the EOs 
have both either been withdrawn or lapsed and been replaced by the Proclamation. While 
international law does contain mechanisms for state responsibility, the U.S. is an incredibly 
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powerful nation with a penchant for ignoring international opinions. Thus, despite this paper’s 
holding that the U.S. is in violation of its international obligations under the UN Convention 
and Protocol, there is very little that can be done practically to hold the U.S. to account.  
Nevertheless, there is much that can be gained from this paper. It brings together all of 
the possibilities available for a state to reject and expel refugees on the basis of national security 
under international law. The issue of immigration and, in particular, of the influx of refugees 
into the U.S. and Europe, is a contentious topic in current politics.447 Therefore, as the 
migration of refugees is increasingly linked to national security, this paper is able to highlight 
many of the overlaps between these two areas in international law. In essence, this paper has 
sought to provide some insight into international refugee law, in which the ‘talismanic 
incantation of national security’448 is currently being exploited at the expense of the world’s 
vulnerable refugee population.  
Importantly, this paper has provided an academic analysis of the EOs and the 
Proclamation from an international law perspective, where much of the previous literature and 
cases focused primarily on U.S. domestic law. Additionally, it has brought together the 
literature on the Article 1F exception clauses, Article 33(2) and the concept of non-entrée and 
shows how such clauses can and, in this case, cannot be applied in practice. The legal fight for 
and against President Trump’s EOs is ongoing. Thus, this paper aims to be at the forefront of 
legal analysis of the United States’ policies regarding refugees and immigration. 
It is essential to recognise that refugees are one of the most vulnerable groups in the 
world. With 22.5 million refugees worldwide,449 it is necessary for states to understand and 
comply with their obligations under international law regarding refugees and particularly, to 
not unnecessarily enact policies in direct conflict with such obligations. It is important that 
states do not abuse the exceptions made available to them under international law in order to 
employ policies that would cause harm and suffering as well as a violation of international 
human rights. When states take advantage of the few exceptions provided in a framework 
created to protect refugees, in order to abandon their fellow human beings, everyone is worse 
off [own emphasis]. It is hoped that this paper has created an understanding of the limitations 
of the national security exceptions under international law and has shown how discriminatory 
orders and proclamations cannot be legally justified. It intends to encourage a recognition of 
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the plight of refugees globally, and to provoke states to uphold their obligations under 
international law as “no one leaves home unless home is the mouth of a shark.”450 
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